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This paper examines empirically whether sophisticated speculative short 
sellers can detect earnings management by targeting stocks with large income-increasing 
discretionary accruals and high total accruals.  Prior research indicates that total accruals 
are overpriced and this overpricing is largely attributable to the mispricing of 
discretionary accruals.  Recent studies show that neither auditors nor financial analysts 
utilize information in accruals. Using samples of 11,537 firm-quarter observations and 
5,118 firm-year observations for 1,146 12/31 non-financial NYSE firms from 1992 to 
1999, I find supporting evidence those speculative short sellers can detect earnings 
management using financial accounting information disclosed in 10-Q and 10-K report.  
Specifically, I identify a significant and positive association between relative short 
interest and quarterly accruals.  When I decompose accruals into its discretionary and 
non-discretionary components, I find that quarterly discretionary accruals are positively 
and significantly related to relative short interest.  I further divide quarterly data into four 
sub-samples of separate fiscal quarters and find that speculative short sellers detect 
earnings management especially in the third and fourth quarters of a fiscal year and trade 
consistent with the information provided in quarterly accruals. In addition, the empirical 
results indicate that speculative short sellers establish short positions in firms with high 
accruals and large income-increasing discretionary accruals estimated using annual 





This paper examines whether sophisticated short sellers can detect earnings 
management and thus target stocks with large income-increasing discretionary 
accruals and high total accruals.  Earnings management has drawn increasing 
attention of regulators, accounting standard setters, and investors.   In 1998, the 
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Arthur Levitt argued 
that earnings management practice masked the underlying performance of the firm 
and advocated increasing the quality of the reported earnings.  In December 1999, the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) strengthened the rules for audit committee by 
requiring all listed firms to have an audit committee consisting of at least three 
independent directors, among whom at least one committee member has accounting 
or financial management expertise.  Accounting frauds and corporate scandals at 
Enron and WorldCom make a campaign against earnings management imminent.   In 
2002, the U.S. congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to improve the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate financial reporting and disclosures.   
  Prior accounting research has explored earnings management incentives 
from three perspectives: (1) capital market expectations and valuations (e.g. Sloan 
1996; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998ab; Erickson and Wang 1999; Xie 2001); (2) 
contracting motivations (e.g. Healy 1985; DeAngelo 1988; DeFond and Jiambalvo 
1994); and (3) industry regulation and other regulations (e.g. Petroni 1992).  This 
study focuses on the first motivation by examining whether the speculative short 
sellers can detect earnings management and anticipate capital market consequences.   
Short sellers engage in short selling by borrowing a security from a broker and selling 
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it with a promise to return it at a later date.  They earn a profit from the decline in a 
security’s price.  Furthermore, they are highly motivated to detect income-increasing 
earnings management because they can profit directly from the overpricing of 
discretionary accruals. 
Previous research has provided conflicting evidence on whether investors 
can detect earnings management.  Some studies have shown that investors appear 
able to see through earnings management in the banking and insurance industry (e.g. 
Petroni 1992; Wahlen 1994; Petroni, et al. 1997; Penalva 1998).  In contrast, several 
recent studies have shown that investors may not fully detect earnings management.  
Specifically, Sloan (1996) documents that the market overprices total accruals.  He 
finds that firms with high accruals experience large negative earnings reversals and 
significantly lower returns in the subsequent year.  Collins and Hribar (2000a) 
provide additional evidence of the accrual anomaly using quarterly data.  They find 
that the accrual (cash flow) component of earnings appears to be overpriced 
(underpriced) because the persistence of the accrual (cash flow) component of 
earnings is overestimated (underestimated).   Xie (2001) further investigates the 
market pricing of accruals by dividing total accruals into two components: normal 
and discretionary accruals.  His findings suggest that discretionary accruals are 
overpriced and the overpricing of total accruals documented in Sloan (1996) is largely 
attributable to the mispricing of discretionary accruals.  Chambers (1999) 
demonstrates that investors who cannot identify the managed portion of reported 
earnings are likely to overvalue firms with income-increasing earnings management 
and undervalue firms with income-decreasing earnings management.  Other studies 
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provide additional empirical evidence of mispricing associated with opportunistic 
earnings management (e.g. Vargus and Beneish 2001; Barth and Hutton 2001; 
DeFond and Park 2001). 
Two recent studies (Teoh and Wong 1999; Bradshaw, et al. 2001) present 
evidence that neither sell-side financial analysts nor independent auditors provide 
investors with information on the future earnings implications of firms with high 
accruals. Teoh and Wong (1999) find that the earnings forecast errors persist up to 
four years after the new equity issuance. They show that forecast errors can be 
explained largely by the discretionary accruals in the issuing year.  Richardson (2003) 
finds no systematic evidence that short sellers anticipate lower future returns on the 
stocks with high total accruals using the accounting information disclosed in the 
annual report.   
This paper investigates whether the speculative short sellers can detect 
earnings management by using quarterly (annual) accounting data and monthly short 
interest1 data from 1992 to 1999.  Speculative short sellers have strong incentives to 
detect earnings management because they can greatly benefit from lower future 
returns on firms that engage in income-increasing earnings management.  Staley 
(1997) describes how fundamental analysis is practiced on Wall Street and illustrates 
that short sellers employ fundamental analysis to identify overvalued securities.  This 
paper is distinguished from prior studies by examining the association between 
directional earnings management as proxied by discretionary accruals and speculative 
short selling activity.  Unlike prior research examining on short selling activity as a 
whole, this paper distinguishes speculative short selling from other short selling 
                                                 
1  Short interest refers to the number of shares that have been sold short. 
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activities motivated by arbitrage and hedging purposes and focuses on speculative 
short selling only.  In addition, this study employs a different research design and 
dataset than those used in prior research.  The results indicate that speculative short 
sellers establish short positions in stocks with high quarterly total accruals.  More 
importantly, the results also suggest that speculative short sellers can distinguish 
discretionary accruals from normal accruals and target stocks that have large income-
increasing discretionary accrua ls, especially in the third and the fourth quarters of the 
fiscal year.  
 I further use annual data to examine the relation between speculative short 
selling and accruals (discretionary accruals).  The results indicate that speculative 
short sellers use accruals information disclosed in the 10-K report and target stocks 
with high total accruals and large income-increasing discretionary accruals.  This 
paper contributes to the accounting literature on earnings management by providing 
empirical evidence that sophisticated speculative short sellers can detect earnings 
management. This paper also provides further insight into how short sellers 
incorporate financial accounting information into their trading strategies.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
prior literature on short selling and earnings management.  Section 3 presents the 
hypotheses.  Section 4 discusses the sample selection and descriptive statistics of the 
data.  The research design and model specification are presented in Section 5.  
Empirical results are illustrated in Section 6.  Section 7 reports the results of the 
sensitivity analysis and concluding remarks are presented in Section 8. 
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2. SUMMARY OF PRIOR LITERATURE ON SHORT SELLING AND 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT  
 
 2.1 Prior Research on Short Selling 
 A short sale refers to a sale of a security that a seller does not own or owns 
but sells without an intention to deliver.  To effectively sell a security, a short seller 
borrows the security from other sources such as institutional investors and broker-
dealers.  The short seller covers the short position by returning the security to the 
lender at a later time.   Short sellers engage in short selling activity to profit from the 
expected decrease in the security price or to hedge the risk of a long position in the 
same underlying security or in another security whose value is linked with the 
underlying security. Short sellers can also short sell against the box to defer capital 
gains tax to a later year before Tax Payer Relief Act of 1997.   I refer to short sellers 
who do not trade for hedging, arbitrage, or tax purpose but only to gain from the 
anticipated downward movement of the security price as “speculative short sellers”.   
The maximum gain on a short position is the sales proceeds when the 
security price decreases to zero. However, the potential downside risk on a short 
position may be theoretically infinite.   Short selling is prohibited in many foreign 
stock markets due to the high risk involved in the short selling activity.   Additionally, 
short sale could drive the security price down substantially.  Meeker (1932) argues 
that the stock market crash in 1929 may have been exacerbated by short sales.    
Consequently, U.S. regulators have established strict rules to monitor short selling 
activities due to this special risk-return profile.  In 1934, the Congress enacted the 
Securities and Exchange Act which included restrictions on short selling.  Section 
10(a) of the Exchange Act grants the Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC) 
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authority to regulate short sales of securities registered on a national securities 
exchange.  Under Rule 10a-1, subject to certain exceptions, short sales of a listed 
security can only be accomplished on a “plus tick” or a “zero plus tick” basis.  The 
“plus tick” refers to short selling at a price above the price of an effective sale 
immediately prior to the short sale.  A “zero tick” refers to a short sale at the last sale 
price if it is higher than the last difference price.  It follows that a short seller cannot 
sell short unless the selling price is higher than the last sales price or the selling price 
is the same as the last sales price if the most recent price was moving upward.  Both 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) 
have adopted this tick test for a short sale.  The tick test reflects the SEC’s concern of 
the adverse effect of short sales in a downward moving market.  The SEC adopted the 
“up-tick” rule in order to allow relatively unrestricted short selling in an upward 
moving market and to prevent the use of short selling as a means of driving the 
market down.  
 Rule 10a-1 only applies to short selling of securities listed or traded on an 
exchange.  In 1986, National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) proposed the 
adoption of similar short sales restriction covering NASDAQ National Market 
System (NMS) securities. In 1994, the SEC approved NASD’s rule.  Under the 
NASD short sale rule (Rule 3350), NASD members cannot sell short NMS securities 
at or below the current best (inside) bid when that bid is lower than the previous best 
(inside) bid.  This is also known as the “bid test”.  McCormick and Reilly (1996) 
examine the economic impact of the Nasdaq short sale rule and find that the rule is 
effective in restricting short selling at the inside bid over the period of large security 
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price downward movement without decreasing the market quality.   They conclude 
that the objective of the NASDAQ short sale rule has been achieved.  
 On August 25, 1988, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-21, which is designed to 
mitigate price manipulation by short sellers around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).  
Short sellers may establish short positions prior to SEOs and cover their short 
positions by purchasing the shares at the fixed offering price, which makes the 
underlying equity subject to price manipulation and short selling less risky.   
Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) examine the short selling activity prior to SEOs and 
find that before SEC Rule 10b-21, short interest measured between the announcement 
date of SEOs and the offer date is three times the short interest accumulated over the 
period of three months before the announcement.  In addition, short selling activity 
returns to its normal level following the offer date.  The increase in short selling 
activity is related to the large equity issuance discount.  However, the levels of short 
interest over the period from the issuance announcement date to the offer date 
decreases significantly following the adoption of Rule 10b-21.  They also find that the 
issuance discounts are smaller after Rule 10b-21 adoption when compared to 
discounts observed prior to its adoption.  Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996)’s findings 
suggest that Rule 10b-21 restricted the short selling activity prior to the SEOs and 
lowered the issuance discount. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) developed a theoretical framework for 
short selling constraints and predicted on the impact of these constraints on price 
adjustment to private information.  They theorized that there are two types of short 
selling costs: short prohibition costs and short restriction costs.  First, short 
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prohibition costs prevent investors who want to sell short from short selling.  Some 
institutional investors and corporate insiders are prevented from short selling by 
regulations or terms in the contracts. The Investment Company Act of 1940 prohibits 
investment companies from engaging in short selling activities except under special 
circumstances.  The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) forbids 
short selling by pension funds.  Some special accounts such as retirement and 
custodial accounts are prohibited from short sales as well.  In addition, the uptick rule 
prohibits short selling at prices lower than the last differing price.   
 Second, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) define short restriction costs as 
those additional costs imposed on short sellers.  These costs include the non 
availability of sales proceeds to short sellers and the low interest that may accrue on 
these proceeds.  Short sellers do not obtain sales proceeds.  The sales proceeds are 
retained as collateral for the owner of the borrowed securities.  Typically, small short 
sellers do not receive any interest on the retained sales proceeds although large short 
sellers may.  Geczy, et al. (2002) examines the equity lending market and short 
selling, and illustrate that an equity loan is a temporary exchange of ownership.  The 
lender transfers legal ownership of some shares to the borrower. At the same time the 
borrower transfers collateral, which is usually in the form of cash and typically 102% 
of equity value.  In the loan contract, a rebate rate represents the interest on the 
collateral that the lender rebates to the borrower, and is determined by negotiation 
between the lender and the borrower.  From the equity borrower’s perspective, the 
rebate rate is essentially the interest on his/her loan.  In the case of short selling, a 
broker acts as an intermediary of an equity loan.  If an institutional investor has been 
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identified as the equity lender, the institution has to pay interest to the broker on the 
sales proceeds. The broker profits from the spread between the interest rebate paid to 
the short seller and the interest collected from the equity lender.  The level of interest 
rate depends on the broker’s difficulty in locating the shares to be borrowed.  Equities 
that are easy and inexpensive to borrow have a high rebate rate.   D’Avolio (2001) 
and Reed (2001) document that the borrowing cost for a large portion of stocks they 
analyzed is low and that the rebate rate follows the overnight Fed Fund rate very 
closely.  Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) document that the rebate rate is usually the 
Fed Funds rate minus 0.25% for the most easily borrowed shares.  On the contrary, 
the rebate rate for stocks that are expensive to borrow is low or even negative.   
Stocks with low or negative rebate rate are “on special” or “hot”.  A negative rebate 
rate is essentially a premium.  That is, the equity borrowers are obligated to pay a 
premium to the lender for the right to borrow, instead of receiving any interest on the 
collateral from the lender.  In the case of short sale, short selling becomes very costly 
if the stocks are on special.  If the borrowed equities are from a retail margined 
account instead of an institutional investor, the owners of the stock do not obtain 
either the sales proceeds or interest because they are not informed that their stocks 
have been lent. 
The Federal Reserve established Regulation T, which requires that short 
sellers deposit 50% of the market value of the securities that have been sold short.  A 
short seller may face a margin call and be obligated to add more funds into his/her 
margin account if the price of the shorted stock increases.   The NYSE requires a 
minimum maintenance margin of 30% of the greater of the current market value of 
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the security or $5 per share.  The margin deposit may take the form of interest-
bearing treasury securities.  
Furthermore, short sellers are required to reimburse the security owner for 
any subsequent dividend declared over the period when the short position is open.  
Frank and Jagannathan (1998) document that the price of the ex-dividend stock is 
typically higher than the price of the pre-dividend share less the dividend.   
Short sellers borrow securities from other investors. The equity lending 
market increases the risk of the short sellers by exposing them to “short squeezes”.  
The security loans are “demand loans,” that is, the owner of the borrowed security 
can sell the security at any time.  If this occurs, short sellers must close the short 
position accordingly.  A short squeeze occurs when alternative lenders are not 
available and the short sellers must purchase the security in the open market to cover 
the short position.  Short sellers may identify the owners of the borrowed shares to 
reduce the risk of a short squeeze.  The brokers may reveal the identity of the lender 
to large short sellers such that short sellers may use this information to assess the 
probability of a short squeeze.  Short sellers are less likely to face a short squeeze for 
stocks with high institutional ownership because a substitute for the stock lender can 
be easily found.  
The costs and risks of short selling discussed above suggest that short sales 
are much more costly than establishing a long position in a security.  Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1987) propose that short sellers are more likely to be informed because 
rational investors engage in short selling only if the benefit generated from a short 
sale outweighs the cost incurred.   In other words, short sellers expect the security 
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price to decrease to the extent that it is sufficient to compensate them for the risks and 
costs they bear.  In their analytical model, informed traders have private information 
and know the true liquidation value of the underlying risky security, whereas 
uninformed traders infer the value of the security based on all public information.  
Their model predicts that the costs of short selling affects the composition of the 
informed versus uninformed traders in the pool of the short sellers.  
Short selling literature is dominated by the view that short interest is a 
bearish indicator.  Hana (1976) argues that short interest is a bullish indicator because 
it implies a future demand for the underlying security.  However, numerous more 
recent studies suggest that short interest conveys bearish information content.  
Figlewski (1981) proposes that the actual volume of short selling provides an 
indication of the extent of adverse belief about the value of stock in the market.  His 
result indicates that lower short interest portfolios experience substantially higher 
realized returns than the high short interest portfolios counterpart. In other words, 
excess returns seem to be negatively correlated with short interest, which is a proxy 
of negative information. However, with the constraint of obtaining proceeds of a short 
sale, neither the short portfolio nor the arbitrage portfolio produced excess profits.  
Other studies fail to identify a strong systematic relation between short interest and 
equity returns (Brent, Morse and Stice 1990; Woolridge and Dickinson 1994; 
Figlewski and Webb 1993).  Senchack and Starks (1993) document that stocks with 
unexpected increases in short interest experience significantly negative abnormal 
returns for a brief period surrounding the short interest announcement date. 
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 Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) use on a sample of firms that have high 
level of relative short interest (e.g. short interest as a percentage of the number of 
shares outstanding is no less than 2.5%).  They argue that the process of random 
sample selection leads to an inability to observe a strong or consistent relationship 
between short interest and excess return.  This is because the random sample used in 
the previous research includes a large portion of firms that do not have short interest 
or have a very small percentage of short interest in a given month.  They find a strong 
negative relationship between short interest and subsequent stock returns, both during 
the time the stocks are heavily shorted and in the subsequent two years.  Abnormal 
returns are even more highly negative for firms that are heavily shorted for more than 
one month.  This result is consistent with the view that short interests convey negative 
information. 
 Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) develop a theoretical model of short 
selling.  In their analytical framework, short sellers are more likely to be informed 
traders because short selling is very costly. Their model predicts that increasing the 
cost of short selling drives relatively more uninformed traders out of the pool of short 
sellers because only informed traders are willing to bear the high cost in order to 
realize anticipated benefits.  Reed (2002) provides supporting evidence of Diamond 
and Verrecchia’s prediction that short sales’ constraints reduce the speed at which the 
prices adjust to private information.  Arnold, et al. (2002) present supporting evidence 
of the proposition of the extended Diamond and Verrecchia model by documenting 
the information content of the short interest increases after Tax Payers’ Relief Act of 
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1997 which eliminates the tax loop hole of the “short sale against box”2.  Recent 
empirical research on short selling provides additional supporting evidence that short 
interest is a strong bearish signal.  Aitken, et al. (1998) show that short sales are 
instantaneous bad news by examining the intra-day price reaction to the information 
on short interest of stocks traded on the Australian Stock Exchange.  Dechow et al. 
(2001) illustrate that short sellers utilize information in the fundamental ratios by 
targeting stocks with low ratios of earnings to the market value (book value to the 
market value) because these firms have lower future returns.  Desai et al. (2002) 
provide additional evidence that heavily shorted NASDAQ firms experience 
significant negative abnormal returns ranging from –0.76% to –1.13% per month. The 
positive relation between the negative return and the level of short interest indicates 
that a high level of short interest is a strong bearish signal.   They also show that 
heavily shorted firms experience a higher probability of being delisted.   
2.2 Prior Research on Earnings Management 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as follows: 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead 
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers… 
Extant accounting literature on earnings management focuses on trying to 
answer two questions: (1) Does earnings management exist? (2) Why do managers 
engage in earnings management?  The typical approach is to identify the managerial 
                                                 
2 Short sale against the box refers to an transaction in which an investor holds a long position in a security 
sells the same security short.  
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incentive structure to manage earnings and examine whether the unexpected 
accounting accruals or accounting method choices are consistent with these incentive 
mechanisms.  Accounting researchers examine the motivation for earnings 
management from three perspectives: (1) capital market expectations and firm 
valuations; (2) contracts based on the accounting numbers; (3) regulation (Healy and 
Wahlen 1999). This paper focuses on the first motivation, that is, equity market 
motivated earnings management. 
Value-relevance capital market research documents that accounting 
information such as earnings has information content.   Investors make their 
investment decisions using firm-specific accounting information.  Market reaction to 
unexpected earnings is reflected in a significant price movement and a change in 
trading volume (e.g. Ball and Brown 1968; Beaver 1968; Bamber 1986; Bamber 
1987).  Investors use firm-specific accounting information in equity valuation and 
optimize their investment portfolio accordingly.  This creates an incentive for 
managers to engage in earnings management to affect the equity pricing.  Similarly, 
financial analysts are a large group of professionals that use accounting information 
extensively.  It is well documented in the financial analyst forecast literature that 
analyst forecasts outperform time-series models as surrogates for market expectations 
of earnings (Brown and Rozeff 1978; Fried and Givoly 1982) because of timeliness 
and the rich information set of financial analysts.  Accounting information is a large 
component of the information set of financial analysts.  The incorporation of the 
accounting information in analysts’ forecasts creates managerial incentives to manage 
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earnings to affect the market expectation of earnings and thus have impact on stock 
price. 
Dye (1988) theorizes the demand for earnings management from two 
perspectives:  internal demand and external demand.  He posits that the external 
demand for earnings management is driven by the existing shareholders’ attempts to 
change prospective investors’ valuations of the firm.  Trueman and Titman (1988) 
provide an explanation of earnings smoothing as managerial incentive to reduce the 
claimholders’ perception of the volatility of the economic earnings of the firm and 
affect their investment decisions accordingly.   
Many studies explore the capital market incentive for managers to engage in 
earnings smoothing by examining unexpected accounting accruals in specific 
transactions in which managers are highly motivated to manage earnings.  
Management buyouts (MBO) may motivate managers to manipulate earnings 
downward prior to the buyout. The empirical evidence on earnings management prior 
to management buyouts is mixed.  DeAngelo (1986) examines the accrual changes of 
buyout firms and the result does not support the earnings management hypothesis.  In 
contrast, Perry and Williams (1994) document significant income-decreasing 
unexpected accruals before MBOs.  Wu (1997) examines 87 MBO cases over the 
period of 1980-1987 and provides supporting evidence that managers manipulate 
earnings downward prior to the MBO proposal.  He reports a systematic relationship 
between the stock price decline in the pre-MBO period and pre-MBO earnings 
changes.  He also shows that the estimated benefit from downward earnings 
manipulation of the sample firms is about $50 million.  Marquardt and Wiedman 
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(2003) use the performance-matched approach developed by Kothari, et al. (2001) to 
estimate the unexpected component of accounts receivable, inventory, accrued 
liabilities, depreciation expenses, and special items. They find unexpected negative 
accounts receivable for a sample of MBOs.  
Erickson and Wang (1999) examine earnings management around stock 
mergers using a sample  of acquiring firms. They find that acquiring firms manipulate 
earnings upward in the quarter prior to a stock merger and conclude that the result is 
consistent with the notion that acquiring firms engage in income-increasing earnings 
management to boost their prices before a stock merger.  Their study also shows that 
discretionary accruals are positively associated with the economic benefit to the 
acquiring firm measured as the relative size of the deal (deal value scaled by the 
market value of the acquiring firm). 
Several studies examine earnings management in the context of equity 
offerings.  Managers are highly motivated to engage in income-increasing earnings 
management to boost stock prices.  Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a) examine the 
relationship between earnings management measured by discretionary accruals and 
the long-run underperformance of Initial Public Offering (henceforth, IPO) firms 
documented in Loughran and Ritter (1995).  They find that large discretionary 
accruals are significantly and negatively related to abnormal stock returns following 
the equity offerings. They document that a hedge portfolio consisting of a long 
position in the firms with low discretionary accruals and a short position in firms with 
high discretionary accruals yields a mean excess return of 102% in the three-year 
period right after the first fiscal year end.  In addition, Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) 
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provide empirical evidence that IPO firms use discretionary accruals to influence 
investor perceptions and the valuation of the firm.  Specifically, they show that firms 
with high levels of discretionary working capital and total accruals in the year when 
the firm goes public have lower future cash flows.  Their findings indicate that net 
income and cash flows from operations increase in the fiscal year prior to the IPO and 
decrease in the year of the IPO.   
Other studies provide empirical evidence of earnings management around 
seasoned equity offerings (henceforth SEO).  Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b) report 
that issuing firms engage in earnings management via significant income-increasing 
discretionary accruals prior to the SEO.  These firms experience subsequent poor 
stock price performance and lower net income.  They find that the negative 
relationship between discretionary accruals and stock returns is stronger for SEO 
firms than for non- issuing firms.  Their result suggests that earning management 
provides some explanation for the underperformance of firms after SEOs that was 
documented in Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995).  They conclude that investors do 
not see through earnings management prior to the SEO and fail to discount the 
managerial manipulations of reported earnings prior to SEOs.  
Rangan (1998) conducts a similar study by examining whether the earnings 
management around SEOs explains the underperformance of SEOs and finds that 
both earning changes and market-adjusted stock returns are significantly and 
negatively related to discretionary accruals prior to the offering.  His result indicates 
that SEO firms are overvalued by the capital market and experience a significant 
decline in earnings driven by earnings management around the offering.  Shivakumar 
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(2000) draws a different conclusion from the investigation of earnings management 
around SEOs.  He also finds evidence of earnings management prior to the equity 
offerings; however, he argues that the objective of earnings management prior to the 
SEO is not to misguide investors but rather to respond rationally to the expected 
trading in the market at the equity-offering announcement.  Investors pool all issuing 
firms together as firms overstating their earnings and discount firm value accordingly 
because firms cannot credibly convey information of the absence of earnings 
management to the capital market.  It follows tha t the issuing firms respond to the 
expected market behavior by managing earnings upward prior to SEO.  He shows that 
earnings management of the issuing firm is a unique Nash equilibrium.  He also 
shows that the significant negative relation between discretionary accruals prior to 
SEO and the subsequent future stock return performance documented in both Rangan 
(1998) and Teoh, et al. (1998b) are not robust to their relatively well-specified 
research methodologies.  He reports that the investors’ trading response to the 
unexpected earnings is significantly weaker in the period subsequent to the 
announcement of SEOs, suggesting that market participants perceive earnings 
management through the equity-offering announcement.  He also shows that 
discretionary accruals prior to the SEOs are significantly related to the two-day 
negative stock price reaction subsequent to the equity issuance announcement.  He 
argues that this relationship implies that investors discount the income-increasing 
earning manipulation at the issuance announcement. 
 The accrual anomaly is well documented in accounting literature.  Sloan 
(1996) documents that the accrual component of earnings is overpriced.  He examines 
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whether the information implications about future earnings reflected by the cash flow 
and accrual components of current earnings are impounded into the equity valuation 
in a timely manner in the capital market.   Bernard and Stober (1989) conclude that 
there is no systematic difference between the information content of cash flows and 
accruals.  In contrast, Sloan (1996) documents that the information content of the 
cash flow component of earnings is different from the information content of the 
accrual component of earnings.  He shows that the persistence of current earnings is 
positively related to the magnitude of the cash flow component of current earnings 
and negatively related to the magnitude of the accrual component of current earnings.  
Furthermore, he shows that the implications for future earnings reflected by the 
current earnings are not fully incorporated into the stock price.  He classifies his 
sample firms into ten deciles based on the ranking of accruals.  He shows that a hedge 
portfolio consisting of a long position in stocks in the lowest deciles of accruals and a 
short position in stocks in the highest deciles of accruals experience significant 
positive size-adjusted abnormal returns of 10.4% in the first year, 4.8% in the second 
year and 3.8% in the third year.  He also reports that the lower (higher) future returns 
of stocks with higher (lower) levels of accruals concentrates around earnings 
announcements in the future.   
Xie (2001) extends the Sloan’s (1996) study by examining whether the 
discretionary component of accruals is mispriced.  He follows DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) and Subramanyam (1996) and estimates discretionary accruals using the cross-
sectional Jones (1991) model.   The result indicates that the market overestimates the 
persistence of the discretionary component of accruals and thus overprices 
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discretionary accruals.  Moreover, he shows that the overpricing of discretionary 
accruals is more severe than overpricing of normal accruals.   He conducts two tests 
in his study.  First, the result from the Mishikin (1983) test provides evidence that the 
valuation coefficient on discretionary accruals is significantly larger than the 
forecasting coefficient of discretionary accruals, suggesting the overvaluation of the 
discretionary accruals by the capital market.  The overpricing of normal accruals is 
less severe than the discretionary accruals counterpart.  Second, the hedge portfolio 
test indicates that hedge portfolio going long in the lowest deciles of discretionary 
accruals and going short in the highest deciles of discretionary accruals generates 
significantly positive abnormal returns in subsequent years. This result suggests that 
discretionary accruals are overvalued in the year that the hedge portfolio is formed.  
The hedge portfolio test does not provide any evidence of the overvaluation of normal 
accruals. He concludes that the mispricing of total accruals documented in Sloan 
(1996) is driven primarily by the overpricing of discretionary accruals.  His findings 
also extend Subramanyam (1996)’s study by providing empirical evidence that the 
market not only prices discretionary accruals but also overprices discretionary 
accruals.  
DeFond and Park (2001) further examine the role of accounting accruals in 
stock valuation.  They provide evidence that the market does not fully adjust for the 
future reversal of discretionary accruals at the earnings announcement date.  
Specifically, their result shows that firms with both good news and income-
decreasing discretionary accruals experience significantly higher cumulative 
abnormal returns than firms with both good news and income-increasing 
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discretionary accruals over the period of 80 days after the earnings announcement.  
The result also indicates that firms with both bad news and income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals have significantly higher cumulative abnormal returns than 
firms with both bad news and income-increasing discretionary accruals over the same 
time periods.  Their study attributes the overpricing of discretionary accruals to the 
market’s under-expectation of the future reversal of discretionary working capital 
accruals.  This is consistent with Xie’s (2001) conclusion that the overpricing of 
discretionary accruals is driven by the overestimation of the persistence of 
discretionary accruals. 
   Collins and Hribar (2000) extend Sloan’s (1996) study by empirically 
examining whether the accrual anomaly on an annual basis holds on a quarterly basis 
and whether the accrual anomaly is different from post-earnings announcement drift. 
Post-earnings announcement drift is a well-documented market anomaly under the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).  Stock prices tend to drift upward for positive 
quarterly earnings surprises and downward for negative quarterly earnings surprise in 
the post-earning announcement period.  Bernard and Thomas (1989) document that a 
hedge portfolio formed by taking a long position in stocks in the highest unexpected 
earnings deciles and a short position in stocks in the lowest unexpected deciles 
generates an estimated abnormal return of approximately 4.2% for 60 days 
subsequent to the earnings announcement.  The annualized abnormal return resulting 
from the drift is 18%.   Ball and Bartov (1996) document that investors systematically 
underestimate the magnitude of serial correlation of the earnings surprise and respond 
to the portion of earnings surprises that have been predictable based on the time-
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series of earnings in the past at the subsequent earnings announcement.  It follows 
that stock prices fail to incorporate the information of current quarterly earnings for 
future earnings.  Collins and Hribar (2000) examine the accrual anomaly using 
quarterly earnings data to compare the accrual-based anomaly with the earnings-
based anomaly.  They find that the market overestimates the persistence of the accrual 
component of quarterly earnings and thus systematically overprices accruals.  Their 
result shows that accrual mispricing is distinct from the post-earnings announcement 
drift anomaly.  They also show that a trading strategy that uses both an earnings- 
based anomaly and an accrual-based anomaly generates larger abnormal returns than 
those that can be generated using a trading strategy that takes advantage of each 
individual anomaly only.   Specifically, a trading strategy that takes a long (short) 
position in stocks with extreme positive unexpected earnings and extreme negative 
(positive) accruals generates abnormal returns which almost doubles the abnormal 
returns generated by trading on each anomaly only over the following two quarters.  
Chambers (1999) documents significant market mispricing related to 
earnings management.  He argues that accounting earnings provide value-relevant 
information for investors to make investment portfolio choices and emphasizes that 
the extent of persistence of accounting earnings affects investors’ stock valuations.  
He posits that opportunistic earnings management makes earnings fail to reflect the 
persistence of economic performance of the underlying firm and the real earnings 
generating capacity of a firm.  He demonstrates that investors who cannot identify the 
managed portion of reported earnings are likely to overvalue firms with income-
increasing earnings management and undervalue firms with income-decreasing 
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earnings management because the extent of persistence of overall earnings will be 
either overestimated or underestimated.  He uses discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
earnings management.  The result suggests that firms that engage in earnings 
management are temporarily mispriced in the market and invested capital is 
misallocated.  
The mispricing of the accrual component of earnings and the discretionary 
component of accruals from the empirical studies discussed above suggests that 
investors do not see through earnings management.  Investors fail to discount the 
earnings with high accruals.  Firms with high accruals are likely to have lower future 
returns.  Recent studies investigate whether extensive accounting information users 
can detect earnings management.  Financial analysts are a large group of 
professionals that use accounting information intensively.  They play an important 
role as an information intermediary.  They expend resources in information 
acquisition and processing and provide information about securities to investors to 
facilitate their investment decisions.  Teoh and Wong (1999) examine whether 
financial analysts can detect earnings management by investigating whether financial 
analysts incorporate the predictable future earnings decline for firms with high 
accruals into their forecast.  They find that discretionary accruals in the equity issue 
year significantly explain analyst annual earnings forecast errors up to four years after 
the new issue.  They further categorize analysts into affiliated and unaffiliated groups 
and find that both groups are credulous about discretionary accruals.   They conclude 
that financial analysts do not see through earnings management using discretionary 
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accruals and their biased assessments of issuers’ accruals leads to overoptimism in the 
equity issuance.    
  Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2001) examine two information 
intermediaries to see whether they can provide information about the subsequent 
earnings problem associated with high accruals in current earnings.  First, they 
examine the forecast behavior of sell-side financial analysts and find that their 
forecast errors are large and negative for firms with high level of accruals.  This is 
consistent with the notion that analysts do not anticipate future earnings decreases for 
high accrual firms.  They provide two possible explanations for their result: (1) 
analysts lack sophistication and skills to fully understand the information content of 
current earnings with high accruals; and (2) sell-side analysts collude with 
management to inflate future earnings expectations.  Their explanations are consistent 
with other studies that report that management engages in earnings manipulation 
through discretionary accruals to boost stock prices around some corporate events 
such as SEO.   Second, they analyze auditor behavior by examining the audit opinion 
and auditor turnover for firms with high accruals.  They show that firms with 
unusually high accruals are more likely to experience decreases in future earnings and 
SEC enforcement actions for Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
violations.  However, they do not find supporting evidence that auditors provide an 
early warning to investors regarding the subsequent earnings decline and the 
increased probability of GAAP violation for these high accrual firms.  There is 
neither an increase in the frequency of modified auditor opinion nor an increase in the 
auditor turnover rate.  They conclude that neither the sell-side financial analysts nor 
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the independent auditors provide investors with information on the future earnings 
implications of firms with high accruals.  
Richardson (2003) investigates overall short selling activities motivated by 
various reasons and finds no systematic evidence that short sellers anticipate lower 
future returns on the stocks with high total accruals based on the accounting 
information disclosed in the annual report.  Specifically, he examines a sample of 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms over the period from 1980 to 1998 and finds 
high accruals firms experience subsequent lower returns.  However, his result shows 
that short sellers trade in both high accruals firms and low accruals firms.  He 
concludes that short sellers do not take the opportunity of earning one-year ahead 8% 
abnormal returns by switching from going short in low accrual firms to going short in 
high accrual firms.  Further analysis shows that short sellers trade actively in glamour 
stocks but fail to see through the future earnings problems of high accrual firms.   
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3. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Short selling allows short sellers to profit from a decrease in a security’s 
price by selling an asset he (she) does not own and purchasing it at a lower price later 
to cover the short position.  In this study, I investigate whether a sophisticated group 
of investors, speculative short sellers, can detect earnings management.  Prior 
literature in short selling provides evidence that short sellers are sophisticated 
investors.  They succeed at identifying mispriced stocks using their knowledge, 
information, and talents.   Among all short sellers, speculative short sellers are highly 
motivated to detect earnings management because they can profit from current 
earnings’ implication of lower future returns for firms with high total accruals and 
large income-increasing discretionary accruals.  Firms with high total accruals are 
likely to experience lower future returns (Sloan 1996).  In addition, firms that engage 
in earnings management through large income-increasing discretionary accruals are 
likely to be overvalued by the market and thus experience lower future returns (Xie 
2001).  Speculative short sellers go short in overpriced stocks with high total accruals 
or large income-increasing discretionary accruals and cover their short positions when 
the stock price subsequently drops.   In this study, I focus on the trading activities of 
speculative short sellers to examine whether they can detect earnings management.  
The motivation for short selling activity can be viewed from three 
perspectives.  First and foremost, short sellers engage in short selling activity for 
speculative purposes.  In other words, investors who short sell for speculative purpose 
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expect to profit from a decline in the security price.   A survey conducted in 1947 
reports that two-thirds of total short selling is motivated by speculation.   
Second, short selling may be an essential component of hedging and 
arbitrage strategies.  Investors may earn an arbitrage profit by taking a relevant 
position in an additional security that is connected to the value of the underlying 
stock. These additional securities include an option on the underlying stock, a 
convertible bond or convertible preferred stock, stock index futures, and other 
financial instruments whose value is linked to the market price of the underlying 
stock.  McDonald and Baron (1973) document that arbitrage and hedging play an 
important role in explaining short selling activity.  They argue that stocks with a 
higher return volatility have a higher level of short interest because hedging can 
motivate short sales.  Their empirical analysis shows that short interest is positively 
related to beta. 
Option trading has two opposite effects on short interest.  Investors with 
unfavorable information on a security and who are either prohibited from short selling 
or prefer not to sell short for various reasons, may switch to purchasing a put option 
on the security.  It follows that there could be a substitution effect between taking a 
long position in a put option and going short.  However, the option market makers 
may increase their short positions in the underlying secur ity to hedge their position.  
Thus, short interest increases with the introduction of the traded options on the 
underlying security.  Figlewski and Webb (1993) present evidence that options 
facilitate short selling and enhance information efficiency of the market.  They find 
that stocks with traded options have higher average levels of short interest than stocks 
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without traded options.  They also show that short selling activity for an individual 
stock increases after option listing.  Options improve transaction efficiency by 
providing investors who are constrained to sell short an opportunity to purchase a put 
option or write a call option as an alternative to sell short the security directly.  In 
addition, options enhance the information efficiency of the market because that short 
sale restriction makes unfavorable information under-represented in the stock price in 
the market.   Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) find that firms with large short positions 
are likely to be firms with listed options.  They document that a group of heavily 
shorted firms have a higher portion of traded call options than a group of randomly 
selected firms.    
  Risk arbitrage literature indicates that short selling can be related to merger 
activity.  Specifically, Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) and Cornelli and Li (2002) 
document that short selling is a part of the investment strategy of risk arbitrageurs.  In 
the case of a stock merger, the stock price of a target firm is typically traded at a 
discount to the acquirer’s offer price after the announcement date of a merger.  The 
arbitrage spread refers to the difference between the acquirer’s offer price and the 
target’s stock price.  Risk arbitrageurs (merger arbitrageurs) attempt to earn a profit 
from this spread.  In a stock merger, risk arbitrageurs lock in the spread by going long 
in the stock of a target firm and going short in the stock of an acquirer.   
Third, short sales can be motivated by tax reasons.  “Short sales against the 
box” are one type of short selling activity in which investors short sell a security that 
he/she holds a long position.  Prior to June 1997, a short sale against the box enabled 
an investor to lock in a profit without recognizing the related capital gains tax 
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immediately. This ability to defer capital gains tax was beneficial to investors 
especially when investors were taxed at a lower rate in the following tax period.  Dyl 
(1978) develops an analytical framework in which a short seller faces a trade-off 
between the benefits from the delayed recognition of capital gains tax and the cost of 
the unavailability of sales proceeds.  He suggests that the length of time that a short 
position is open, the current and future tax rate for the investor, and the size of the 
capital gain all affect an investor’s decision to short sale against the box.  He argues 
that an investor who engages in short sales against the box follows a “minimum cost 
strategy” by increasing short selling at the end of the tax year and covering the short 
position early in the subsequent year such that he/she can keep the time of the open 
short position short.   If an investor follows this strategy, we expect an increase in 
short interest in December and a decrease in short interest in the following January.   
Brent, et al. (1990) find that an average increase in the aggregate market short interest 
is largest (5.45%) in December and an average aggregate market short interest 
decreases significantly (-6.12%) in January in the following year.   
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (henceforth TRA1997) eliminates this tax 
loophole. TRA1997 classifies short sales against the box as constructive sales; 
therefore, an investor who adopts a short sale against the box trading strategy can no 
longer defer the capital gains tax, but recognize the related taxable gain immediately.  
Arnold, et al. (2002) examine the impact of TRA1997 on the information content of 
short interest and find that short interest conveys more bearish information after 
TRA1997 for a large sample of NYSE firms.   Their empirical result is consistent 
with the Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) model. 
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 I hypothesize that only speculative short selling is informative.  Speculative 
short sellers are sophisticated investors that are well informed.  They have skills, 
expertise, and ability to conduct fundamental analysis and identify securities that are 
overvalued by the capital market.  Firms that are heavily shorted by speculative short 
sellers experience lower future returns.  In contrast, short sales for arbitrage, hedging, 
and tax purposes are non- informative.  I refer to this non- information motivated short 
selling as non-speculative trading in the short selling market.   Richardson (2003) 
does not distinguish between speculative short sellers from short sellers motivated by 
other reasons such as arbitrage, hedging, and tax purposes.   Using the total short 
selling activities for a specific security instead of focusing on short selling motivated 
by speculative purpose only introduces noise in the empirical examination of the 
relationship between short sellers and earnings management.  Hence, unlike 
Richardson (2003), my study focuses on speculative short selling only.   
Speculative short selling is information based short selling activity.  I 
control for non- information based short selling by constructing a few control 
variables.  Specifically, I use a dummy variable (Option Dummy) to indicate whether 
the security has a traded option, a dummy variable (Convertible Dummy) to indicate 
whether the security has convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, and a dummy 
variable (Merger Dummy) to indicate whether there is a stock merger announcement 
in which the sample firm is an acquirer.  These variables are used to control for short 
selling activity for hedging and arbitrage purposes.   
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) document that short sellers are more likely 
to be informed traders because short selling incurs higher costs than selling outright. 
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Moreover, short selling has more restrictions than a direct sale. They characterize 
short interest as a bearish indicator.  Their model predicts that an increase in the costs 
of short selling increases the bearish information content of the short interest.  Recent 
empirical studies provide supporting evidence that short interest conveys negative 
information on the underlying security.  Dechow, et al. (2001) document that short 
sellers target overpriced stocks reflected by the low ratios of fundamentals to market 
values and cover their short positions as the ratios revert.  Speculative short sellers are 
informed investors who bet the decrease in stock price and thus profit from the price 
difference accordingly.  
The accrual anomaly is well documented in accounting literature.  
Specifically, Sloan (1996) documents that the accrual component of earnings is 
overpriced.  His evidence suggests that investors underestimate the persistence of the 
cash flow component of current earnings and overestimate the persistence of the 
accrual component of current earnings.  The prospect of future earnings conveyed by 
the current earnings of the firm does not fully impound into the stock price promptly.  
Firms with high total accruals tend to experience negative future abnormal stock 
returns.  Hedge portfolios yield significantly positive size-adjusted abnormal returns 
in the following three years after the portfolio formation date.  
Xie (2001) further decomposes total accruals into its discretionary accruals 
and non-discretionary accruals components and examines whether the two 
components are mispriced.   He demonstrates that the discretionary component of 
accruals is overpriced and this overpricing contributes greatly to the mispricing of 
total accruals. 
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Collins and Hribar (2000) extend Sloan’s (1996) study by empirically 
examining whether there is an accrual anomaly using quarterly earnings data.  They 
provide evidence that the market systematically overprices (underprices) the accrual 
(cash flow) component of quarterly earnings.  They also find that the accrual (cash 
flow) mispricing is distinct from the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly.  
Their study focuses on total quarterly accruals only.   
 In this study, I use both quarterly earnings data and annual earnings data to 
empirically investigate whether speculative short sellers can detect earnings 
management.   First, I examine whether short sellers utilize information in the total 
accrual component of earnings.  Second, I decompose total accruals into its 
discretionary and non-discretionary components and examine whether short sellers 
can detect earnings management by targeting stocks with large income-increasing 
discretionary accruals. I predict that securities with both high total accruals and 
income-increasing discretionary accruals have lower future returns. I hypothesize that 
speculative short sellers are informed and exploit the accrual anomaly by trading on 
the information content of the mispriced total accruals.  In addition, I hypothesize that 
speculative short sellers are sophisticated enough to distinguish between the 
discretionary and non-discretionary components of accruals and exploit the 
overvaluation of the discretionary component by targeting stocks with large income-
increasing discretionary accruals.   In sum, I hypothesize that sophisticated short 
sellers can detect income-increasing earnings management.   My hypotheses stated in 
the alternative forms are as follows: 
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H1: Speculative short interest is positively related to quarterly total 
accruals. 
H2: Speculative short interest is positively related to quarterly 
discretionary accruals. 
H3:  Speculative short interest is positively related to total accruals. 




4.  SAMPLE SELECTION, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, VARIABLE 
DEFINITIONS  
 
4.1 Sample Selection 
 
My empirical analysis centers on the relationship between short interest and 
both quarterly earnings and annual earnings of NYSE firms.  It follows that the data 
in this study include two samples.  The first sample consists of all firm-quarter 
observations while the second sample consists of all firm-year observations.  The 
final sample of all firm-quarter (firm-year) observations has to meet the following 
criteria: 
(1) The firm has reported monthly short interest data for June, 
September, and December in the current year and April in the 
following year.  The monthly short interest data is compiled by the 
NYSE. 
(2) The firm has fiscal-year end of 12/31. 
(3) The firm has available annual or quarterly accounting data from 
Research Insight such as earnings, dividend, and other information 
required for estimation of non-discretionary accruals (discretionary 
accruals). 
(4) Firms are non-financial NYSE firms.  Firms with two-digit SIC code 
between 60 and 67 are excluded.  
(5)  The firm has stock return information and the number of shares 
outstanding information from the Center for Research in Security 
Price (CRSP) database over the period of 1992-1999. 
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Tables 1 and 2 report the sample selection process and its influence on the 
final sample size for quarterly and annual data respectively.  For the quarterly data, I 
first obtain data of short selling activity from the short interest database compiled by 
NYSE.  The monthly short interest data that matches fiscal quarters includes 86,410 
firm-quarter observations.  I exclude firms whose fiscal-year end is not December and 
sample is reduced to 35,051.  I further eliminate firm-quarter observations for which 
discretionary accruals cannot be estimated using the cross-sectional modified Jones 
model due to insufficient accounting information from the Research Insight database.  
I also exclude financial service firms that have a two-digit SIC code between 60 and 
67, inclusive.  Finally, I exclude observations that lack information on stock returns 
and the number of shares outstanding from CRSP.  The final sample consists of 
11,537 firm-quarter observations.  Similarly, for the annual data, all selection criteria 
bring the final sample to 5,118 firm-year observations for 1,146 firms. 
The quarterly accounting data from Research Insight is available only after 
1991.  My sample period ranges from 1992 to 1999.  Short interest from June 1992 
through April 1999 is obtained from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).  NYSE 
compiles short interest data monthly based on the short positions held as of settlement 
on the 15th of each month.   The corresponding trade date is the eighth of each month.  
For example, short interest data for April 1999 corresponds to the short interest over 
the period from the ninth of March 1999 to the eighth of April 1999.  The short 
interest data compiled by NYSE is advantageous because it includes all firms traded 
on NYSE.  There is no selection bias involved.  Prior studies in short sale uses short 
sale data reported in newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal.  Short sale data  
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Table 1 Sample Selection for Quarterly Data 
 
 




Observations in the 
Sample  




Less: Observations for which the firm has non-
December fiscal year end 
 
(51,359) 35,051 
Less: Observations for which discretionary accruals 
cannot be estimated using cross-sectional modified 




Less: Observations that are financial service firms 
 
(1,376) 13,198 
Less: Observations without available stock returns 







Observations by Quarter 
 
First Quarter 2,664 
Second Quarter 2,656 
Third Quarter 2,725 















Table 2 Sample Selection for Annual Data 
 
 




Observations in the 
Sample 




Less: Observations for which the firm has non-
December fiscal year end 
 
(13,119) 9,193 
Less: Observations for which discretionary accruals 
cannot be estimated using cross-sectional modified 




Less: Observations that are financial service firms 
 
(680) 5,556 
Less: Observations without available stock returns 



















from this source is incomplete.  Newspaper typically discloses short sale information 
only for firms that have large short positions or firms that have a large change in short 
interest.   The reporting criteria depend on the assessment of “large”, which varies 
across time.  For example, from October 1992 to September 1993, the Wall Street 
Journal reports short sales for firms with more than 150,000 shares to be sold short or 
short position changes by at least 50,000 from the previous month whereas in August 
1995, the Wall Street Journal reports short sales for firms with more than 300,000 
shares have been sold short or the number of shares sold short changes by more than 
50,000 from the last month (Asquith and Meulbroek 1995).  It follows that firms 
whose short position does not meet the reporting criteria will not appear in the 
newspaper even though the relative short interest (short interest divided by the 
number of shares outstanding) may be very high.  Thus, research based on short 
interest data from the news source is biased against these firms.  Using the complete 
short sale data compiled by NYSE eliminate selection bias that may arise using short 
interest data from news source. 
The accounting data are from the Standard and Poor’s Research Insight 
database, and the stock price and return information is from the Center for Research 
in Security Price (CRSP) database.  Options Clearing Corporation provides 
information on whether the stocks have traded options.  I obtain information on which 
stocks have convertible securities from the Research Insight database.   The stock 
merger data are extracted from the merger and acquisition database from the 




Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
This table presents definitions and data sources of the dependent variable, independent 
variables and control variables used in the study.   
   
   




Relative Short Interest Short interest divided by the number of 
shares outstanding  




Difference between quarterly earnings 
before extraordinary items and 
quarterly cash flows from operations 
scaled by the total assets at the 





Difference between annual earnings 
before extraordinary items and annual 
cash flows from operations scaled by 






Difference between quarterly total 
accruals and the non-discretionary 
quarterly accruals estimated using 






Difference between annual total 
accruals and the non-discretionary 
annual accruals estimated using cross-
sectional modified Jones model 
Research Insight 
Option Dummy Dummy variable whose value is set to 1 
if the stock has a traded option and zero 
otherwise 
 






Table 3 –Continued 
 
Convertible Dummy Dummy variable whose value is set to 1 
if the stock has a convertible debt or 
convertible preferred stock 
 
Research Insight 
Merger Dummy Dummy variable whose value is set to 1 
if the firm is an acquirer in a stock 
merger during the given month.   
 
Securities Data Corporation 
Ln (Volume)  The natural logarithm of one plus the 
average daily trading volume 
Short interest data complied 
by NYSE 
 
Ln (SIZE) The natural logarithm of firm size 
calculated as the sum of market value 
of common stock and the book value of 
debt and the preferred stock  
 
Research Insight 
Dividend Yield Quarterly or annual dividend yield Research Insight 
Stock Return Stock return compounded from the 9th 
of the previous month to the 8th of the 
current month 
CRSP 
Market Return CRSP value-weighted return 
compounded from the 9th of the 





4.2 Sample Industry Distribution 
Table 4 reports the industry distribution of sample firms.  The industry 
composition is based on the annual data.  The sample includes 1,146 firms from 52 
industries classified by the two-digit SIC code. The large number of industry 
classification suggests the sample firms are representative of the universe of the 
industry.  The relative large group of firms are from mining industry (SIC code 10, 
13, 14), electric, gas and sanitary services (SIC code 49) and service industry (SIC 
code 70-87). 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics of the variables of interest for a full 
sample of 11,537 firm quarters for non-financial NYSE firms over the period of 
1992-1999.  The mean and median size of the firm is 6,776 and 1,606 million dollars 
respectively.  Firm size has a minimum value of $19 million and a maximum value of 
$509,278 million.  In this study, I use the natural logarithm of the sum of the market 
value of common stock and the book value of debt and preferred stock to control for 
firm size. 
NYSE reports short interest data covering more than 3,000 firms on average 
in the sample period except 1992 and 1993.  In this study, I include all firms in the 
NYSE short interest report in a given month with available quarterly accounting data 
from Research Insight and stock return data from CRSP.  The short interest in a given 
month ranges from zero to 42.6% of outstanding shares.  The mean (median) short 
position as a percentage of the number of shares outstanding is 1.73% (0.78%).   
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Table 4 Sample Composition by Industry 
This table reports the industry distribution of the 1,146 firms. 
 
Industry Number of Firms SIC code  Percentage 
Mining 109 10,13,14 9.51 
Construction 17 15,16,17 1.48 
Food and Kindred 
Products 28 20 2.44 
Textile Products 17 22, 23 1.48 
Lumber and Wood 
Products, Furniture 23 24,25 2.01 
Paper and Allied 
Products 34 26 2.97 
Printing and Publishing 28 27 2.44 
Chemical and Allied 
Product 93 28 8.12 
Petroleum and Coal 29 29 2.53 
Plastic and Leather 
Products 
25 30, 31 2.18 
Stone, Clay, Glass and 
Concrete Products 18 32 1.57 





65 35 5.67 
Electric Equipment and 
Components 56 36 4.89 
Transportation 
Equipment 
39 37 3.40 
Measurement, 
Analyzing, Control 
Instrument and related 
Product 
34 38 2.97 
Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing 10 39 0.87 
Transportation Service 37 40,42,44,45,47 3.23 
Communications 50 48 4.36 
Electric, Gas & 
Sanitary Services 
134 49 11.69 
Whole Sale Trade 35 50,51 3.05 
Retail Trade 42 52-59 3.66 
Services 139 70-87 12.13 
Public Administration 7 99 0.61 
Total 1,146  100 
 
 43 
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics (Quarterly Data) 
This table reports the summary statistics of the dependent (independent) variables for the full sample of firm quarter observations from 1992 to 1999.    
Variables Minimum Lower Quartile Mean Median Upper Quartile Maximum Std Dev 
Relative Short 
Interest 0.0000 0.0029 0.0173 0.0078 0.0181 0.4259 0.0290 
        
Discretionary 
Accruals -1.4857 -0.0823 -0.0414 -0.0148 0.0204 0.9807 0.1243 
        
 
Total Accruals -1.4818 -0.1380 -0.0766 -0.0569 -0.0044 0.9984 0.1179 
        
Convertible 
Dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.1435 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3505 
        
 
Option Dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.5610 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4963 
        
 
Volume 11.0000 21,118 282,357 86,619 281,395 18,928,031 610,018 
        
 
Ln(Volume) 2.4849 9.9579 11.0628 11.3693 12.5475 16.7562 2.1377 
        
 
Size 19.0150 568.0250 6,775.5457 1,605.9190 4,791.2610 509,278 20,493 
        
 
Ln(Size) 2.9452 6.3422 7.4605 7.3815 8.4746 13.1408 1.5854 
        
 
Dividend Yield 0.0000 0.0000 0.0047 0.0035 0.0068 1.4271 0.0149 
        
 
Merger Dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0782 
        
Stock 
Return  -0.5195 -0.0459 0.0073 0.0078 0.0598 1.4354 0.1024 
 
Market Return -0.0778 -0.0055 0.0129 0.0218 0.0434 0.0530 0.0354 
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Figure 1 shows the distribution of the average relative short interest in June, 
September, December, and April in each year from 1992 to 1999.  Short interest 
reaches the maximum in April 1998.  The average relative short interest is 2.17% for 
sample firms in April 1998.   
The summary statistics show that 56.10% of firm-quarter observations have 
traded options.  In addition, 14.35% of the firm-quarter observations have convertible 
securities in the form of either convertible debt or convertible preferred stock.  
Among all firm-quarter observations, 0.6% of firms announced a stock merger in 
which firms are acquirers in the month of June, September, and December in the 
current year and April in the following year. The mean and median values of the 
quarterly dividend yield (dollar dividends divided by the market value by the end of 
the fiscal quarter) are 0.47% and 0.35% respectively. On average, the stock return 
from the ninth of the previous month to the eighth of the current month is 0.73%; the 
relevant market index return over the same period is 1.3%.  The distribution of the 
average daily trading volume varies greatly across firm-quarters with a minimum of 
11 and a maximum of 18,928,031.   I measure trading volume as the natural logarithm 
of one plus the average trading volume to mitigate the skewness.  The mean and the 
median of total quarterly accruals are –0.077 and –0.057 respectively.  Discretionary 
accruals range from –1.49 to 0.98 with a mean (median) value of –0.04 (–0.015). 
Table 6 reports summary statistics for a sample of 5,118 firm-year 
observations for non-financial NYSE firms over the period of 1992-1999.  Firm size 
has a minimum value of $3.36 million and a maximum of $508,713 million.  The 





Figure 1 Average Relative Short Interest over the Sample Period of 1992-1999 



















































Table 6 Descriptive Statistics (Annual Data) 
This table reports the summary statistics of the dependent (independent) variables for the full sample of firm year observations from 1992 to 1999.    
Variables Minimum Lower Quartile Mean Median Upper Quartile Maximum Std Dev 
Relative Short 
Interest 0.0000 0.0026 0.01849 0.0080 0.0187 0.8337 0.0359 
        
Discretionary 
Accruals -1.5291 -0.0273 0.0102 0.0082 0.0465 5.8539 0.1358 
        
 
Total Accruals -1.4242 -0.0835 -0.0549 -0.0509 -0.0218 0.8504 0.0900 
        
Convertible 
Dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.1331 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3397 
        
 
Option Dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.4912 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 
        
 
Volume 9.0000 19,680 282,985 85,140 277,977 18,928,031 650,201 
        
 
Ln(Volume) 2.3026 9.8874 11.0486 11.3521 12.5353 16.7562 2.1510 
        
 
Size 3.3630 586.7350 6,865.2615 1,759.3750 5,221.9620 508,713 19,413 
        
 
Ln(Size) 1.2128 6.3746 7.5050 7.4727 8.5606 13.1396 1.6225 
        
 
Dividend Yield 0.0000 0.0000 0.0208 0.0143 0.0302 1.6692 0.0341 
        
 
Merger Dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0035 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0592 
        
Stock 




volume is highly skewed with mean and median of 282,985 and 85,140 respectively.  
The relative short interest in April following each fiscal year end from 1992 to 1998 
ranges from zero percent to 83.37% of the number of shares outstanding at the time 
when short interest is measured.  On average, short interest is 1.8% of the number of 
shares outstanding.   The dividend yield at fiscal year end has mean and median of 
2.08% and 1.43% respectively.  Total accruals have a mean and median of –0.055 and 
–0.051 whereas discretionary accruals have a mean and median of 0.01 and 0.008 
respectively.  Table 6 indicates that 49% of the firm-year observations have a traded 
option and 13% have either convertible debt or convertible preferred stock. The 
statistics also show that 0.35% of the annual data are involved in a stock merger in 
which the firm is an acquirer with an announcement date falling into the period from 
March 9th to April 8th in the years 1993 to 1999.   On average, the contemporaneous 




5.  RESEARCH DESIGN AND MODEL 
5.1 Research Design 
My analysis of both quarterly and annual data consists of two parts.  In the 
first part, I estimate discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management.  In 
the second part, I utilize multivariate regression models to examine whether short 
sellers can identify the income-increasing earnings management through discretionary 
accruals and the information content of total accruals. 
      5.2 Discretionary Accruals Estimation for Quarterly Data 
I estimate quarterly accruals as the difference between quarterly earnings 
before extraordinary items (Research Insight Item #8) and qua rterly cash flows from 
operations3 scaled by total assets at the beginning of the quarter.   I measure earnings 
management through discretionary accruals by employing the cross-sectional 
modified Jone’s model adapted on a quarterly basis.  This measurement is consistent 
with the earnings management estimation documented in Balsam, et al. (2002).  The 
discretionary accruals model was advocated by Jones (1991), developed using a 
cross-sectional approach by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and modified by Dechow, 
et al. (1995).  Discretionary accruals are measured as the difference between total 
accruals and non-discretionary accruals.  The non-discretionary component of 
accruals is a two-step estimate.  In the first step, I regress total accruals on the change 
in revenues scaled by total assets at the beginning of the quarter and on gross 
property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets at the beginning of the quarter.  
                                                 
3 Research insight reports data from the statement of cash flows on a cumulative basis. For the 2nd, 3rd and 
4th quarters of a fiscal year, the cash flows from operation are calculated by taking the difference between 




Firms are categorized into different industry groups based on the two-digit SIC code. 
I estimate the model separately for each industry group and each fiscal quarter using 
all firm-quarters with available accounting data, the same two-digit SIC code, and 
December fiscal year-end. Any industry group with fewer than 10 firms is excluded.   
In the second step, I calculate non-discretionary accruals based on the parameter 
estimates from the cross-sectional Jone’s model and adjust the change in revenues by 
the change in receivables (Equation 1).   
 
( )[ ] ( ) jt1jtjt31jtjtjt21jt11jtjt TAQ/PPEQTAQ/RECQREVQ)TAQ/1(TAQ/ACCRQ ε+α+∆−∆α+α= −−−−  
                 (1) 
      Where ACCRQ = total accruals in the current quarter; 
TAQ = total assets at the beginning of the quarter; 
?REVQ  = change in revenue from the last quarter; 
?RECQ = change in receivables from the last quarter; 
PPEQ = gross property, plant and equipment in the current quarter. 
Quarterly discretionary accruals are measured as the difference between 
total accruals and non-discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets at the 
beginning of the quarter.  
     5.3   Model Specification for Quarterly Data 
Firms are required to file their 10-Q reports with the SEC within 45 days 
after the end of the fiscal quarter.4  I assume that short sellers conduct fundamental 
analysis using information in the quarterly financial accounting report when the 10-Q 
                                                 
4 Easton and Zmijewski (1993) analyze 193,283 10-Q filings and find that on average, 10-Qs become 
publicly available 44.7 days after the fiscal quarter. 
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report becomes publicly available and establish short positions in stocks with high 
total accruals and large income-increasing discretionary accruals. Thus, I measure the 
dependent variable (short selling activity) as the relative short interest 45 days after 
the fiscal quarter-end for a sample of all firm-quarter observations.  The relative short 
interest is defined as short interest divided by the number of shares outstanding on the 
eighth of that month to match the trade date of the short interest data.  The monthly 
short interest data includes the short selling activity from the ninth of the previous 
month to the eighth of the current month.  Hence, I use the short interest data in the 
month of June, September, and December in the current year to match the 
discretionary accruals (total accruals) data in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd quarters respectively.  
In addition, firms typically file 10-K report within 90 days after the fiscal year end.  
Thus, I match relative short interest data in April in the following year with 
discretionary accruals (total accruals) in the 4th quarter. 
I employ quarterly discretionary accruals (total accruals) as the independent 
variable to examine the relationship between short selling and discretionary accruals 
(total accruals).  I also include other control variables in the regression analysis.  Sias 
and Starks (1997) document that institutional ownership and firm size is correlated.  
Large firms are likely to have high institutional ownership.  Firms with high levels of 
institutional ownership have more stocks available to be bought and sold short.  Thus, 
I use firm size to control for the availability of shares in the regression.  Firm size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the sum of market value of the common equity 
and the book value of total debt and preferred stock.  Stocks with high trading volume 
are more liquid. Graham, et al. (1999) argues that short sellers are more likely to trade 
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in stocks with lower transaction costs.  Short interest is expected to be higher for 
stocks with high trading volume.  I include the natural logarithm of one plus the 
average daily trading volume from the ninth of the previous month to the eighth of 
the current month in the regression.  As discussed earlier, dividends increase the costs 
for short sellers.  Stocks with higher dividend yields are less likely to be sold short, 
ceteris paribus.   I employ quarterly dividend yield as another determinant of short 
selling activity.  I also use the stock return compounded from the ninth of the 
previous month to the eighth of the current month to control for stock performance.   
Similarly, my regression includes the CRSP value-weighted market return 
compounded over the same period to match the trade date of short selling and to 
control for overall market performance.   
In the following analysis, I also control for non-information-based 
determinants of short selling because this study focuses on information motivated 
short selling.  Previous studies have shown that short selling may be used for hedging 
and arbitrage purposes; furthermore, stocks with traded options have higher levels of 
short interest (Brent, et al. 1990; Graham, et al. 1999).   I include an option dummy 
variable to capture the effect of traded options. The value of the option dummy 
variable is set to 1 if the stock has a traded option and zero otherwise.  Brent, et al. 
(1990) and Graham, et al. (1999) argue that the convertible security holder may 
engage in short selling for hedging purposes because of the imbedded option on the 
stock.  Thus, I also construct a convertible security dummy variable in my analysis.   I 
also include year dummy variables to control for time specific effect in the models.    
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Table 3 summarizes the dependent variable, independent variable and other control 
variables.  
     The models for all firm-quarter observations are summarized in the 
following regressions: 


















































































































































































      5.4 Discretionary Accruals Estimation for Annual Data 
Many accounting researchers attempt to develop an adequate accrual model 
to capture earnings management through discretionary accruals. Several studies have 
developed time-series discretionary accrual models (e.g. Healy 1985; DeAngelo 
1986; Jones 1991; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Dechow, et al. 1995).  Among these five 
accrual models, the Jones and the Modified Jones model are widely used because they 
are better specified and are more powerful. 
Time-series models require continuous observations for a given firm over 
several years and thus impose an assumption of stationarity on the series.  Recent 
studies overcome the restrictions of time-series models by switching to across-
sectional variation of the model.  DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Subramanyam 
(1996a) develop a cross-sectional Jones model.  They argue that this cross-sectional 
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estimation mitigates the survivorship bias and increases the precision of estimates due 
to larger sample sizes.  However, the principal disadvantage of the model is ignorance 
of the variation in parameter estimates.  Bartov, et al. (2001) provides evidence of the 
superior performance of the cross-sectional Jones and modified Jones models to their 
time-series counterparts in the context of audit qualification.  
I employ the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model to estimate 
discretionary accruals because it is the most widely used accrual model in the extant 
earnings management literature.  Specifically, I calculate total accruals as the 
difference between earnings before extraordinary items and the cash flows from 
operations divided by total assets at the beginning of the year.  Total accruals are 
regressed on the change in revenues scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year 
and gross property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
year.  The model is estimated for each fiscal year using all firm-year observations 
with the same two-digit SIC code and December fiscal year end.  I exclude firm-year 
observations whose industry category has fewer than 10 firms with the required 
information for estimation.   Discretionary accruals are the residuals of the model 
after making an adjustment by subtracting the change in receivables from the change 
in revenues.  The model after adjustment is presented in the following 
equation:





      Where ACCR = total accruals in the current year; 
TA = total assets at the beginning of the year; 
   ?REV = change in revenue from the last year; 
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?REC = change in receivables from the last year; 
PPE = gross property, plant and equipment in the current year. 
      5.5 Model Specification for Annual Data 
The SEC requires that firms file 10-K reports within 90 days after the fiscal 
year-end.  Alford, Jones, and Zmijewski (1994) report that more than eighty percent 
of firms file their 10-K reports within this required period.  Hence, I measure short 
selling activity as relative short interest three months after the fiscal year-end for a 
sample of all firm-year observations.   
The dependent variable is relative short interest from March 9 to April 8 in 
the subsequent year.  In model 1, I employ discretionary accruals estimated from the 
annual data as the independent variable.   The control variables include the natural 
logarithm of one plus the average daily trading volume from March 9 to April 8 in the 
following year, the contemporaneous stock return over the same period, stock 
dividend yield, a merger dummy variable to control for the risk arbitrage in stock 
merger, an option dummy variable, a convertible dummy to control for short selling 
for arbitrage and hedging purpose, and the year dummy variables to control for time 
specific effect.  In model 2, total accruals are used as independent variable and the 
other control variables are the same as those in model 1. The following regressions 

































































6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for short selling groups constructed 
based on the level of short selling activities.  Specifically, two groups are formed. 
Low level of relative short interest group includes firm quarters with relative short 
interest no greater than the mean of relative short interest of all firm-quarter 
observations.  High level of relative short interest group consists of firm quarters with 
relative short interest greater than the mean of the relative short interest of all firm-
quarter observations.  Discretionary accruals for the low relative short interest group 
and high relative short interest group are -0.043 and –0.036 respectively.   Mean 
discretionary accruals of these two groups are significantly different (t-statistic= 
 –2.71).  Similarly, low relative short interest group has significantly lower total 
accruals (t-statistic= –2.43).  Consistent with the notion that short selling could be 
motivated by arbitrage and hedging purpose, the high level of relative short interest 
group has stocks that are more likely to have traded options, convertible debt or 
convertible preferred stock, and be an acquirer in a stock merger.  Moreover, stocks 
with high levels of short interest have lower dividend yield, supporting the notion that 
stocks with lower costs attract short sellers.  In addition, stocks with higher short 
selling activity tend to be large firm and firms that are heavily traded.  Finally, stock 
returns and market returns are not significantly different between two groups. 
Table 8 presents Pearson correlation coefficients and related p-values.  
Quarterly accruals are significantly and positively related to short selling activities 
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Table 7 Descriptive Statistics of Short Selling Groups  
This table presents the descriptive statistics of short selling groups.  The low level of relative short interest group 
includes firm quarters with relative short interest no greater than the mean of relative short interest of all firm-
quarter observations.  The high level of relative short interest group consists of firm quarters with relative short 
interest greater than the mean of the relative short interest of all firm-quarter observations. 
 
 
Low Level of 
Relative Short 
Interest   
 
High level of 
Relative Short 




Variables Mean Mean Mean t-statistic p-value 
Discretionary Accruals  -0.043 -0.036 -0.007 -2.71 0.0067 
Total Accruals  -0.078 -0.072 -0.006 -2.43 0.0151 
Ln(Volume) 10.777 11.860 -1.083 -27.30 <0.0001 
Ln(Size) 7.421 7.571 -0.150 -5.24 <0.0001 
Dividend Yield 0.0051 0.0036 0.0015 7.16 <0.0001 
 
Stock Return 0.0077 0.0062 0.0015 0.62 0.5332 
Market Return 0.0129 0.0130 -0.000035 -0.05 0.9641 
Convertible Dummy  0.0855 0.2890 -0.2340 -24.75 <0.0001 
Option Dummy  0.5027 0.6776 -0.201 -18.13 <0.0001 
Merger Dummy  0.0034 0.0138 -0.010 -4.71 <0.0001 





Table 8 Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
This table presents correlation coefficients for variables of interest for 11,537 firm quarter observations.  The probability that each 
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with coefficient of 0.039 and a p-value less than 0.0001.  This provides supporting 
evidence that short sellers target stocks with higher accruals.  In addition, I find a 
significantly positive correlation between quarterly discretionary accruals and relative 
short interest (coefficient=0.037 and p-value < 0.0001).  The correlation coefficient is 
0.037 and p-value is less than 0.0001. This is consistent with the prediction that short 
seller detect earnings management through discretionary accruals by selling short 
stocks with large income-increasing discretionary accruals.   
 Consistent with the conjecture that short selling may be motivated by 
arbitrage and hedging, the option dummy variable, convertible dummy variable, and 
the merger dummy variable are significantly and positively related to relative short 
interest.  The option dummy variable is highly correlated with the relative short 
interest with a coefficient of 0.132 (p-value: <0.0001).  This is consistent with prior 
research that the existence of a traded option on the underlying stock increases short 
selling activities (Figlewski and Webb 1993).  The highly significant and positive 
correlation coefficient between the convertible dummy variable and relative short 
interest indicates that short selling may be motiva ted by hedging and arbitrage 
purpose.  This is consistent with Brent, Morse and Stice (1990) in that short selling is 
an integral part of hedging and arbitrage strategy.  The coefficient between the merger 
dummy variable and the short selling activity is significantly positive, suggesting that 
short sale is positively related to the risk arbitrage in the stock merger activities. 
 The quarterly dividend yield is significantly and negatively associated with 
the percentage of shares sold short with a correlation coefficient of –0.034 and p-
value of 0.0003. Dividends increase the cost of short selling because short sellers are 
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obligated to reimburse the equity owner any dividend declared during the time period 
of a short sale.  Additionally, short sellers essent ially repay the borrowed stock at a 
higher price because of the ex-dividend day effect, that is, stock prices fail to adjust 
fully for the dividend.  This is consistent with the notion that stocks with lower short 
selling costs attract short sellers.   
Trading volume is significantly and positively correlated with relative short 
interest (coefficient of 0.194 and p-value < 0.0001).  This suggests that stocks with 
high trading volume have a high level of short interest.  There is no significant 
relation between firm size and short selling activity.   I find that firm size and trading 
volume are highly significantly and positively correlated (0.57).  Thus, I use trading 
volume and firm size alternatively in separate regression models. 
6.2  Multivariate Analysis 
6.2.1. Analysis of Full Sample of Firm-quarter Observations  
The results of the multivariate analysis of the full sample of 11,537 firm-
quarter observations are presented in Table 9.  This regression includes pooled data 
for all fiscal quarters from 1992 to 1998.  The first column reports regression results 
using quarterly discretionary accruals as the independent variable (Model 1). The 
second column presents the regression results using quarterly total accruals as the 
independent variable (Model 2).  The results indicate that relative short interest is 
significantly and positively related to quarterly total accruals with a coefficient of 
0.011 and t-statistic of 5.1.  This implies that short sellers establish short positions in 
stocks with high accruals. 
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Table 9: Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and 
Short Interest 
(Quarterly Data)  
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest.  
Data include 11,537 firm-quarter observations of non-financial NYSE stocks .  The dependent variable is 
relative short interest (short interest divided by the number of shares outstanding on the 8th of the given 
month of the years from 1992 to 1999). The independent variables include the quarterly discretionary 
accruals in four quarters estimated from cross-sectional modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, 
quarterly total accruals, an option dummy variable, which is set to 1 if the stock has a traded option and 
zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible 
preferred stock, a merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in a given 
month and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of one plus the average daily trading volume, 
quarterly dividend yield, year dummy variables, the stock return, which is compounded from the 9th of the 
previous month to the 8th of the current month, and the CRSP value-weighted index return compounded 
from the 9th of the previous month to the 8th of the current month. T-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 
 -0.0125 -0.0123 Intercept 
 (-9.02***) (-8.86***) 
    




    
+  0.0111 Total Accruals  
  (5.10***) 
    
+ 0.0024 0.0024 Option Dummy  
 (4.19***) (4.05***) 
    
+ 0.0209 0.0209 Convertible 
Dummy   (28.30***) (28.26***) 
    
+ 0.0026 0.0027 Average Daily 
Trading Volume  (14.03***) (14.32***) 
    
– -0.0376 -0.0359 Dividend Yield  
 (-2.20**) (-2.10**) 
    
 0.0040 0.0043 Stock Return  
 (1.47) (1.58) 
    
 -0.0147 -0.0158 Market Return 
 (-1.72*) (-1.86**) 
    
+ 0.0128 0.0125 Merger Dummy  
 (3.93***) (3.83***) 
    





Table 9 –Continued 
 
 Dummy 93-98 
 
Suppressed Suppressed 
    













   Discretionary accruals are also significantly and positively associated with 
short selling activity (coefficient: 0.009; t-statistic: 4.48).  Short sellers appear able to 
see through income-increasing earnings management and go short in the stocks with 
high levels of discretionary accruals.  An increase in discretionary accruals is 
associated with 0.9% increase in relative short interest.  Consistent with prior 
research, stocks with traded options have higher levels of short interest, indicating 
options facilitate short selling activity.  The coefficient of Option Dummy is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level.  In model 1, this coefficient is 0.0024 with 
t-statistic of 4.19 and p-value of less than 0.0001.  In model 2, the coefficient is 
0.0024 with t-statistic of 4.05 and p-value of less than 0.0001.  The option market 
makers increase the short positions in the underlying securities to hedge their 
positions.  Because investors may use options as a substitute for going short when 
they have pessimistic beliefs, the positive coefficient indicates that options act as an 
instrument to achieve an arbitrage strategy and this arbitrage-motivated short selling 
dominates the alternative of short selling for speculative purposes.  The coefficients 
of Convertible Dummy in model 1 and model 2 are 0.0209 in both models and are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that stocks with convertible 
securities have higher levels of relative short interest.  This is consistent with the 
notion that arbitrageurs may establish short positions to offset the imbedded option on 
the underlying security.  
The coefficients of Merger Dummy are 0.0128 and 0.0125 in model 1 and 
model 2 respectively. These significantly positive coefficients (p-value < 1%) of the 
merger dummy variable suggest that risk arbitrageurs engage in short selling activity 
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to lock in the arbitrage spread.  Trading volume is significantly and positively 
associated with relative short interest.  The coefficients of the trading volume are 
0.0026 and 0.0027 for models 1 and 2 respectively.  These two trading volume 
coefficients are both significant at the 1% level.  This result indicates that heavily 
traded stocks have large short selling activity. This evidence is consistent with prior 
studies in that short sellers target stocks with lower transaction costs.   In addition, the 
result shows that stocks with lower dividend yield are more likely to be sold short.  
Dividend yield is inversely related to short selling activity.  The coefficient of 
dividend yield is –0.038 in model 1 and –0.036 in model 2.   Both coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  This evidence is consistent with prior studies 
in that short sellers target stocks with lower costs of short selling.  The result shows 
no significant relation between contemporary stock return and short selling activity.   
However, the contemporary market return is negatively related to the relative short 
interest at the 10% level. 
6.2.2. Analysis of Sample of Firm-quarter Observations by Separate Quarters  
I conduct further analysis of the relation between speculative short selling 
activity and accrual management by decomposing the quarterly data into four 
different quarters.  The results are reported in Tables 10 through 13.  Quarterly 
discretionary accruals are employed as the independent variable in Models 1 and 2 
and quarterly total accruals are used as the independent variable in Models 3 and 4, 
respectively.  Table 10 reports the regression results for the relationship between 
relative short interest in June and discretionary accruals (total accruals) in the first  
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Table 10 Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in June (Quarterly Data) 
 
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest in June for the years 1992 through 1998.  Data includes 
2,664 firm-quarter observations of non-financial NYSE stocks .  The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the number of shares 
outstanding on the June 8 for the years 1992 to 1998). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the first quarter, which are estimated from the 
cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the first quarter, an option dummy variable, which is set to 1 if the stock has a 
traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, a merger dummy 
variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of one plus the 
average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred stock), dividend yield in the first 
quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from the May 9 to June 8 . t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * 
denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 -0.0118 0.0076 -0.0118 0.0076 Intercept 
 (-4.17***) (2.51***) (-4.19***) (2.49***) 
      
+ -0.0077 -0.0059   Discretionary 
Accruals   (-0.61) (-0.46)   
      
+   0.0095 0.0069 Total Accruals  
   (0.69) (0.50) 
      
+ 0.0017 0.0064 0.0017 0.0064 Option Dummy  
 (1.48) (5.52***) (1.49) (5.52***) 
      
+ 0.0200 0.0208 0.0200 0.0208 Convertible Dummy  
 (13.63***) (14.11***) (13.63***) (14.11***) 
      
+ 0.0027  0.0027  Average Daily 
Trading Volume  (7.16***)  (7.16***)  
      
  -0.0006  -0.0006 Firm Size 





– -0.3712 -0.3539 -0.3708 -0.3537 Dividend Yield 
 (-4.20***) (-3.93***) (-4.19***) (-3.93***) 
      
 -0.0045 -0.0041 -0.0047 -0.0043 Stock Return 
 (-0.72) (-0.63) (-0.75) (-0.68) 
      
+ 0.0138 0.0135 0.0137 0.0134 Merger Dummy  
 (2.72***) (2.64***) (2.70***) (2.63***) 
      
Dummy 93-98  
Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed 
      
      
No of Observations  2,664 2,664 2,664 2,664 
Adjusted R-square  0.1274 0.1116 0.1275 0.1116 
F Statistic  30.91*** 26.72*** 30.92*** 26.73*** 
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quarter.  There is no significant association between short selling activity and either 
discretionary accruals or total accruals.  Relative short interest is significantly and 
positively related to the Option Dummy in Models 2 and 4. The Convertible Dummy 
and Merger Dummy variables are positive and statistically significant at the l% level 
in all four models, consistent with the notion that hedging and arbitrage can motivate 
short selling.  The Average Daily Trading Volume is positively related to short selling 
activity in all four models.  The coefficient on dividend yield is significantly negative 
in all four models. 
Table 11 reports the regression results for the association between short 
interest in September (August 9 to September 8) and discretionary accruals (total 
accruals) in the second quarter. The results show that discretionary accruals are 
positively related to relative short interest.  The coefficients of discretionary accruals 
in Models 1 and 2 are 0.0108 and 0.0102 respectively.  These coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  In Model 3, total accruals are positively 
related to short selling activity with a coefficient of 0.0149, t-statistic of 2.34, and p-
value of 0.019.  In Model 4, total accruals are marginally significant with p-value of 
0.1001.  The Option Dummy, Convertible Dummy, and Merger Dummy variables are 
all systematically positively associated with relative sho rt interest.   The coefficient 
on Trading Volume is significantly positive whereas the coefficient on the Firm Size 
is significantly negative.   
 The results reported in Table 12 indicate that both discretionary accruals 
and total accruals in the third quarter are significantly and positively related to the 
percentage of the number of shares sold short in December (November 9 to  
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Table 11: Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in September (Quarterly 
Data)  
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest in September for the years 1992 through 1998.  Data 
includes 2,656 firm-quarter observations of non-financial NYSE stocks .  The dependent variable is re lative short interest (short interest divided by the number of 
shares outstanding on September 8 for the years 1992 to 1998). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the second quarter, which are 
estimated from the cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the second quarter, an option dummy variable, which is 
set to 1 if the stock has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible preferred 
stock, a merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural 
logarithm of one plus the average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred stock), 
dividend yield in the second quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from August 9 to September 8.  t -statistics are reported in 
the parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 -0.0094 0.0107 -0.0094 0.0106 Intercept 
 (-3.30***) (3.48***) (-3.30***) (3.47***) 
      
+ 0.0108 0.0102   Discretionary 
Accruals   (1.87*) (1.75*)   
      
+   0.0149 0.0105 Total Accruals  
   (2.34**) (1.64) 
      
+ 0.0035 0.0087 0.0035 0.0087 Option Dummy  
 (2.97***) (7.37***) (2.94***) (7.34***) 
      
+ 0.0198 0.0203 0.0198 0.0204 Convertible Dummy  
 (13.22***) (13.57***) (13.24***) (13.61***) 
      
+ 0.0022  0.0023  Average Daily 
Trading Volume  (5.72***)  (5.86***)  
      
  -0.0013  -0.0012 Firm Size 





– -0.1671 -0.0801 -0.1541 -0.0716 Dividend Yield  
 (-1.71*) (-0.81) (-1.57) (-0.72) 
      
 0.0118 0.0097 0.0121 0.0098 Stock Return  
 (1.92*) (1.57) (1.98**) (1.59) 
      
+ 0.0169 0.0203 0.0166 0.0200 Merger Dummy  
 (2.38**) (2.84***) (2.33**) (2.81***) 
      
 Dummy 93-98 
 Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed 
      
      
No of Observations  2,656 2,656 2,656 2,656 
Adjusted R-square  0.1152 0.1080 0.1158 0.1079 
F Statistic  27.58*** 25.73*** 27.75*** 25.70*** 
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Table 12: Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in December (Quarterly 
Data)  
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and  short interest in December for the years 1992 through 1998.  Data 
includes 2,725 firm-quarter observations of non-financial NYSE stocks .  The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the number of 
shares outstanding on December 8 for the years 1992 to 1998). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the third quarter, which are estimated 
from the cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the third quarter, an option dummy variable, which is set to 1 if the 
stock has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, a merger 
dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of one 
plus the average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred stock), dividend yield in the 
third quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from November 9 to December 8. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 -0.0106 0.0090 -0.0101 0.0093 Intercept 
 (-3.91***) (3.09***) (-3.70***) (3.19***) 
      
+ 0.0110 0.0100   Discretionary 
Accruals   (2.95***) (2.68***)   
      
+   0.0143 0.0110 Total Accruals  
   (3.38***) (2.60***) 
      
+ 0.0038 0.0088 0.0037 0.0087 Option Dummy  
 (3.33***) (7.67***) (3.25***) (7.57***) 
      
+ 0.0224 0.0232 0.0223 0.0232 Convertible Dummy  
 (15.36***) (15.89***) (15.31***) (15.89***) 
      
+ 0.0022  0.0023  Average Daily 
Trading Volume  (6.06***)  (6.22***)  
      
  -0.0011  -0.0010 Firm Size 






– -0.0128 -0.0124 -0.0128 -0.0125 Dividend Yield  
 (-0.72) (-0.69) (-0.72) (-0.70) 
      
 -0.0080 -0.0076 -0.0081 -0.0078 Stock Return  
 (-1.63) (-1.55) (-1.64) (-1.59) 
      
+ 0.0086 0.0087 0.0082 0.0085 Merger Dummy  
 (1.19) (1.20) (1.14) (1.17) 
      
 Dummy 93-98 
 
Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed 
      
      
No of Observations  2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 
Adjusted R-square  0.1369 0.1280 0.1378 0.1279 
F Statistic  34.24*** 31.77 34.48 31.73 
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December 8).  Specifically, the coefficients on discretionary accruals in Models 1 and 
2 are 0.011 and 0.010 respectively.  Similarly, the coefficients on total accruals in 
Models 3 and 4 are 0.014 and 0.011 respectively.  These coefficients are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  This indicates that short sellers establish short 
position in stocks with high accruals and large discretionary accruals in the third 
quarter.  The Option Dummy and  Convertible Dummy variables are positively 
associated with relative short interest as predicted.   Higher levels of Trading Volume 
are related to higher levels of short interest. 
The findings reported in Table 13 indicate a positive relationship between 
discretionary accruals (total accruals) in the fourth quarter and short interest in April 
(March 9 to April 8) in the subsequent year.  The coefficient of discretionary accruals 
is 0.0118 in Model 1 and 0.0109 in Model 2.  The coefficient of total accruals is 
0.0208 in Model 3 and 0.0165 in Model 4.   These four coefficients are larger in 
magnitude and more significant than the four coefficients of discretionary accruals 
(total accruals) in table 12.   The Option Dummy is significantly and positively related 
to relative short interest in Models 2 and 4.  The Convertible Dummy is systematically 
positively associated with short selling activity through all four models.  Heavily 
traded stocks have larger short positions. 
In sum, the results from the analysis of firm-quarter observations suggest 
that short sellers establish their short positions in stocks with high quarterly total 
accruals (discretionary accruals).  This provides strong evidence that short seller are 
sophisticated investors.  They utilize interim financial accounting information on a 
timely basis and can detect earnings management via discretionary accruals and trade  
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Table 13: Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in April (Quarterly Data) 
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest in April for the years 1993 through 1999.  Data includes 
3,492 firm-quarter observations of non-financial NYSE stocks .  The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the number of shares 
outstanding on April 8 for the years 1993 to 1999). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the fourth quarter, which are estimated from the 
cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the fourth quarter, an option dummy variable, which is set to 1 if the stock 
has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, a merger dummy 
variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of one plus the 
average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred stock), dividend yield in the fourth 
quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from the March 9 to April 8. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * 
denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 -0.0132 0.0115 -0.0118 0.0122 Intercept 
 (-4.75***) (3.90***) (-4.26***) (4.12***) 
      
+ 0.0118 0.0109   Discretionary 
Accruals   (3.47***) (3.16***)   
      
+   0.0208 0.0165 Total Accruals  
   (5.29***) (4.14***) 
      
+ 0.0011 0.0071 0.0011 0.0070 Option Dummy  
 (0.99) (6.13***) (0.99) (6.08***) 
      
+ 0.0209 0.0221 0.0205 0.0219 Convertible Dummy  
 (14.34***) (15.16***) (14.09***) (15.02***) 
      
+ 0.0031  0.0033  Average Daily 
Trading Volume  (8.40***)  (8.79***)  
      
  -0.0010  -0.0008 Firm Size 
  (-2.75***)  (-2.32**) 






– -0.0790 -0.0517 -0.0584 -0.0367 Dividend Yield  
 (-1.39) (-0.89) (-1.03) (-0.64) 
      
 0.0136 0.0161 0.0143 0.0169 Stock Return  
 (2.73***) (3.21***) (2.88***) (3.38***) 
      
+ 0.0109 0.0142 0.0102 0.0137 Merger Dummy  
 (1.50) (1.95*) (1.41) (1.87*) 
      
 Dummy 93-98 
 
Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed 
      
      
No of Observations  3,492 3,492 3,492 3,492 
Adjusted R-square  0.1053 0.0891 0.1094 0.0910 
F Statistic  32.61*** 27.28*** 33.98*** 27.89*** 
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on the information in total accruals and discretionary accruals.  I argue that managers 
of a firm tend to manage earnings more as the fiscal year-end is drawing near because 
the overall earnings performance is revealed through the earnings per share by the 
end of the fiscal year.  Managers are under great pressure to meet or beat the financial 
analyst forecast.   Moreover, managers may employ other earnings smoothing 
mechanisms during the fiscal year.  Specifically, they may engage in risk 
management by using financial derivatives to smooth earnings.  Pincus and Rajgopal 
(2002) suggest that managers first make decisions on implementing risk management 
strategy by using financial derivatives and then, especially in the fourth fiscal quarter 
reduce the residuals of volatility of earnings by trading off discretionary accruals 
management and hedging using derivatives.   The sequential process of choice 
between risk management and earnings management provide potential explanations 
for the strong systematic relationship between discretionary accruals and relative 
short interest in the third and fourth quarters. 
6.2.3. Analysis of a Sample of Firm-year Observations  
In addition to the analysis of quarterly data, I further investigate whether 
there is an association between the level of relative short interest and annual accruals 
(annual discretionary accruals).  The relative short interest is measured as the short 
interest in April (March 9 to April 8) following the fiscal year-end divided by the 
number of shares outstanding on eighth of April after the fiscal year-end.  The results 
are reported in Table 14.  The coefficient on discretionary accruals is 0.0071 and 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  The coefficient on total accruals is 0.0263 and 
significant at the 1% level.  Consistent with the results using quarterly data, total 
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accruals and discretionary accruals are significantly and positively associated with the 
level of short interest, suggesting that short sellers see through earnings management 
by targeting stocks with high levels of total accruals and discretionary accruals based 
on the financial accounting information in the 10-K report.  Additionally, the results 
indicate a positive relationship between relative short interest and the Convertible 
Dummy, Trading Volume, and Stock Returns variables.   Also, the findings suggest 
that high dividend yield stocks have low levels of short selling activities. 
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Table 14 Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and 
Short Interest in April  
(Annual Data) 
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interset in 
April for the years 1993 through 1999.  Data includes 5,118 firm-year observations of non-financial NYSE 
stocks.  The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the number of shares 
outstanding on the April 8 for the years 1993 to 1999). The independent variables include discretionary 
accruals in the fourth quarter, which are estimated from the cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted 
on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the fourth quarter, an option dummy variable, which is set to 1 if the 
stock has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has 
convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, a merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock 
merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm 
of one plus the average daily trading volume, dividend yield in the fourth quarter, year dummy variables, 
the stock return, which is compounded from the March 9 to April 8. t-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 
 -0.0125 -0.0118 Intercept 
 (-4.69***) (-4.42***) 
    
+ 0.0071  Discretionary 
Accruals   (1.98**)  
    
+  0.0263 Total Accruals  
  (4.85***) 
    
+ -0.0009 -0.0009 Option Dummy  
 (-0.81) (-0.83) 
    
+ 0.0175 0.0175 Convertible Dummy  
 (12.01***) (12.05***) 
    
+ 0.0035 0.0037 Average Daily 
Trading Volume  (9.96***) (10.24***) 
    
– -0.0451 -0.0450 Dividend Yield  
 (-3.13***) (-3.13***) 
    
 0.0128 0.0143 Stock Return  
 (2.78***) (3.06***) 
    
+ 0.0111 0.0106 Merger Dummy  
 (1.35) (1.29) 
    
 Dummy 93-98 
 Suppressed Suppressed 
    






    
No of Observations  5,118 5,118 
Adjusted R-square  0.0656 0.0691 





7. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) demonstrate that earnings management could be 
motivated by regulation.   In the United States, financial service industries such as 
banking, insurance and utilities are heavily regulated.  The regulators monitor these 
industries closely using accounting information.   In past, rates have been regulated 
closely in the utilities industry.   Prior research in earnings management provides 
evidence of earnings management in insurance, banking and utilities industries (e.g. 
Paek 2001).   However, there are few studies that provide information as to whether 
investors and regulators of utilities detect earnings management.  Among my sample 
firms, 11.69% are electric, gas and sanitary services with a two-digit SIC code of 49.  
In the following analysis, I restrict my sample to non-regulated firms.  Tables 15 to 
20 report the regression results of all models.  The results for both quarterly data and 
annual data are qualitatively similar to results reported in Tables 9 through 14.  Both 
discretionary accruals and total accruals are significantly and positively related to the 





Table 15 Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and 
Short Interest Excluding Utilities 
(Quarterly Data) 
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest.  
Data includes 11,197 firm-quarter observations of non-financial, non-regulated NYSE stocks .  The 
dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the number of shares outstanding on 
the 8th of the given month of the years 1992 to 1999). The independent variables include quarterly 
discretionary accruals in four quarters estimated from the cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on 
a quarterly basis, quarterly total accruals, an option dummy variable, which is set to 1 if the stock has a 
traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt 
or convertible preferred stock, a merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced 
in a given month and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of one plus the average daily trading 
volume, quarterly dividend yield, year dummy variables, the stock return, which is compounded from the 
9th of the previous month to the 8th of the current month, and the CRSP value-weighted index return 
compounded from the 9th of the previous month to the 8th of the current month. t-statistics are reported in 
the parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 
 -0.0124 -0.0122 Intercept 
 (-8.69***) (-8.55***) 
    
+ 0.0101  Discretionary 
Accruals   (4.81***)  
    
+  0.0115 Total Accruals  
  (5.24***) 
    
+ 0.0020 0.0019 Option Dummy  
 (3.36***) (3.22***) 
    
+ 0.0223 0.0223 Convertible Dummy 
 (29.09***) (29.07***) 
    
+ 0.0026 0.0027 Average Daily 
Trading Volume  (13.70***) (14.00***) 
    
– -0.0327 -0.0312 Dividend Yield  
 (-1.89*) (-1.80*) 
    
 0.0044 0.0047 Stock Return  
 (1.60) (1.71*) 
    
 -0.0148 -0.0160 Market Return 
 (-1.70*) (-1.84**) 
    
+ 0.0131 0.0128 Merger Dummy  
 (3.94***) (3.84***) 







 Dummy 93-98 
 
Suppressed Suppressed 
    
No of Observations  11,197 11,197 
Adjusted R-square  0.1204 0.1208 
F Statistic  110.50*** 110.85*** 
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Table 16: Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in June Excluding Utilities 
(Quarterly Data) 
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest in June for the years 1992 through 1998.  Data includes 
2,586 firm-quarter observations of non-financial, non-regulated NYSE stocks .  The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the 
number of shares outstanding on June 8th for the years 1992 to 1998). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the first quarter, which are 
estimated from the cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the first quarter, an option dummy variable, which is set 
to 1 if the stock has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, a 
merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of 
one plus the average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred stock), dividend yield in 
the first quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from the May 9 to June 8 . t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, 
* denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 -0.0121 0.0077 -0.0122 0.0077 Intercept 
 (-4.20***) (2.50***) (-4.22***) (2.49***) 
      
+ -0.0072 -0.0052   Discretionary 
Accruals   (-0.56) (-0.40)   
      
+   0.0094 0.0064 Total Accruals  
   (0.67) (0.45) 
      
+ 0.0013 0.0062 0.0013 0.0062 Option Dummy  
 (1.08) (5.16***) (1.09) (5.17***) 
      
+ 0.0214 0.0222 0.0214 0.0222 Convertible Dummy  
 (14.08***) (14.48***) (14.09***) (14.48***) 
      
+ 0.0027  0.0027  Average Daily 
Trading Volume  (7.10***)  (7.10***)  
      
  -0.0007  -0.0007 Firm Size 






– -0.3524 -0.3168 -0.3530 -0.3173 Dividend Yield  
 (-3.82***) (-3.37***) (-3.82***) (-3.38***) 
      
 -0.0031 -0.0028 -0.0034 -0.0030 Stock Return  
 (-0.49) (-0.44) (-0.53) (-0.47) 
      
+ 0.0148 0.0145 0.0147 0.0144 Merger Dummy  
 (2.85***) (2.76***) (2.82***) (2.74***) 
      
 Dummy 93-98 
 
Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed 
      
      
No of Observations  2,586 2,586 2,586 2,586 
Adjusted R-square  0.1302 0.1143 0.1302 0.1143 
F Statistic  30.76*** 26.66*** 30.78*** 26.67*** 
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Table 17: Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in September Excluding 
Utilities (Quarterly Data) 
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest in September for the years 1992 through 1998.  Data 
includes 2,576 firm-quarter observations of non-financial, non-regulated NYSE stocks .  The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by 
the number of shares outstanding on September 8 for the years 1992 to 1998). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the second quarter, 
which are estimated from cross-sectional modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the second quarter, an option dummy variable, 
which is set to 1 if the stock has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible 
preferred stock, a merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the 
natural logarithm of one plus the average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred 
stock), dividend yield in the second quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from the August 9 to September 8.  t-statistics are 
reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 -0.0094 0.0110 -0.0094 0.0109 Intercept 
 (-3.24***) (3.51***) (-3.24***) (3.49***) 
      
+ 0.0118 0.0115   Discretionary 
Accruals   (2.01**) (1.95*)   
      
+   0.0150 0.0107 Total Accruals  
   (2.32**) (1.65*) 
      
+ 0.0032 0.0086 0.0032 0.0085 Option Dummy  
 (2.65***) (7.03***) (2.62***) (7.00***) 
      
+ 0.0211 0.0215 0.0212 0.0216 Convertible Dummy  
 (13.58***) (13.83***) (13.60***) (13.87***) 
      
+ 0.0022  0.0022  Average Daily 
Trading Volume  (5.53***)  (5.67***)  
      
  -0.0013  -0.0013 Firm Size 






– -0.1262 -0.0135 -0.1157 -0.0069 Dividend Yield  
 (-1.22) (-0.13) (-1.12) (-0.07) 
      
 0.0115 0.0096 0.0118 0.0096 Stock Return  
 (1.83*) (1.52) (1.87*) (1.52) 
      
+ 0.0179 0.0212 0.0176 0.0209 Merger Dummy  
 (2.41**) (2.84***) (2.37**) (2.80***) 
      
 Dummy 93-98 
 
Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed 
      
      
No of Observations  2,576 2,576 2,576 2,576 
Adjusted R-square  0.1172 0.1110 0.1177 0.1106 
F Statistic  27.31*** 25.72*** 27.43*** 25.63*** 
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Table 18 Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in December Excluding 
Utilities (Quarterly Data) 
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest in December for the years 1992 through 1998.  Data 
includes 2,643 firm-quarter observations of non-financial, non-regulated NYSE stocks .  The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by 
the number of shares outstanding on December 8 for the years 1992 to 1998). The independent variables include the discretionary accruals in the third quarter, 
which are estimated from the cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the third quarter, an option dummy variable, 
which is set to 1 if the stock has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible 
preferred stock, a merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the 
natural logarithm of one plus the average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred 
stock), dividend yield in the third quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from the November 9 to December 8. t-statistics are 
reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 -0.0104 0.0095 -0.0098 0.0098 Intercept 
 (-3.71***) (3.18***) (-3.49***) (3.28***) 
      
+ 0.0118 0.0111   Discretionary 
Accruals   (3.11***) (2.89***)   
      
+   0.0149 0.0119 Total Accruals  
   (3.48***) (2.75***) 
      
+ 0.0035 0.0085 0.0034 0.0084 Option Dummy  
 (2.96***) (7.22***) (2.87***) (7.10***) 
      
+ 0.0239 0.0245 0.0238 0.0245 Convertible Dummy  
 (15.75***) (16.15***) (15.71***) (16.16***) 
      
+ 0.0022  0.0023  Average Daily 
Trading Volume  (5.83***)  (6.00***)  
      
  -0.0011  -0.0010 Firm Size 






– -0.0114 -0.0106 -0.0116 -0.0107 Dividend Yield  
 (-0.63) (-0.58) (-0.64) (-0.59) 
      
 -0.0069 -0.0064 -0.0071 -0.0067 Stock Return  
 (-1.38) (-1.26) (-1.41) (-1.32) 
      
+ 0.0083 0.0083 0.0079 0.0081 Merger Dummy  
 (1.14) (1.14) (1.09) (1.11) 
      
 Dummy 93-98 
 
Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed 
      
      
No of Observations  2,643 2,643 2,643 2,643 
Adjusted R-square  0.1399 0.1318 0.1407 0.1315 
F Statistic  34.05*** 31.84 34.26 31.77 
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Table 19: Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in April Excluding 
Utilities (Quarterly Data) 
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest in April for the years 1993 through 1999.  Data includes 
3,392 firm-quarter observations of non-financial, non-regulated NYSE stocks .  The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the 
number of shares outstanding on April 8 for the years 1993 to 1999). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the fourth quarter, which are 
estimated from cross-sectional modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the fourth quarter, an option dummy variable, which is set to 
1 if the stock has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, a 
merger dummy variable, wh ich indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of 
one plus the average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred stock), dividend yield in 
the fourth quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from the March 9 to April 8. t -statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, 
**, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 -0.0131 0.0119 -0.0118 0.0126 Intercept 
 (-4.61***) (3.93***) (-4.13***) (4.15***) 
      
+ 0.0131 0.0124   Discretionary 
Accruals   (3.77***) (3.53***)   
      
+   0.0218 0.0176 Total Accruals  
   (5.46***) (4.36***) 
      
+ 0.0006 0.0068 0.0006 0.0067 Option Dummy  
 (0.54) (5.67***) (0.52) (5.60***) 
      
+ 0.0221 0.0233 0.0217 0.0231 Convertible Dummy  
 (14.70***) (15.42***) (14.46***) (15.30***) 
      
+ 0.0032  0.0033  Average Daily 
Trading Volume  (8.26***)  (8.67***)  
      
  -0.0010  -0.0009 Firm Size 






– -0.0686 -0.0335 -0.0479 -0.0183 Dividend Yield  
 (-1.18) (-0.57) (-0.83) (-0.31) 
      
 0.0138 0.0161 0.0146 0.0171 Stock Return  
 (2.71***) (3.15***) (2.90***) (3.35***) 
      
+ 0.0102 0.0137 0.0095 0.0131 Merger Dummy  
 (1.40) (1.85*) (1.30) (1.77*) 
      
 Dummy 93-98 
 
Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed 
      
      
No of Observations  3,392 3,392 3,392 3,392 
Adjusted R-square  0.1082 0.0922 0.1123 0.0940 
F Statistic  32.65*** 27.50*** 33.99*** 28.05*** 
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Table 20 Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and 
Short Interest in April Excluding Utilities 
(Annual Data) 
This table reports regression results for the determinants of short interest in April for the years 1993 
through 1999.  Data includes 4,383 firm-year observations of non-financial NYSE stocks.  The dependent 
variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the number of shares outstanding on April 8 of 
the years 1993 to 1999). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the fourth quarter, 
which are estimated from the cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total 
accruals in the fourth quarter, an option dummy variable, which is set to 1 if the stock has a traded option 
and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible 
preferred stock, a merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same 
month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of one plus the average daily 
trading volume, dividend yield in the fourth quarter, year dummy variables, the stock return, which is 
compounded from the March 9 to April 8. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 
 -0.0133 -0.0125 Intercept 
 (-4.35***) (-4.11***) 
    
+ 0.0068  Discretionary 
Accruals   (1.79**)  
    
+  0.0277 Total Accruals  
  (4.75***) 
    
+ -0.0011 -0.0011 Option Dummy  
 (-0.82) (-0.88) 
    
+ 0.0201 0.0201 Convertible Dummy  
 (12.31***) (12.36***) 
    
+ 0.0036 0.0037 Average Daily 
Trading Volume  (8.95***) (9.24***) 
    
 -0.0526 -0.0515 Dividend Yield  
 (-3.14***) (-3.08***) 
    
 0.0125 0.0139 Stock Return  
 (2.49***) (2.76***) 
    
+ 0.0088 0.0082 Merger Dummy  
 (0.99) (0.92) 
    
 Dummy 93-98 
 Suppressed Suppressed 








    
No of Observations  4,383 4,383 
Adjusted R-square  0.0692 0.0733 






This paper provides empirical evidence that sophisticated speculative short 
sellers exploit the market mispricing of quarterly total accruals and discretionary 
accruals. The results suggest that speculative short sellers target stocks with high 
accruals that are overvalued by the capital market.  More importantly, speculative 
short sellers are sophisticated enough to distinguish the discretionary component of 
accruals from the non-discretionary component of accruals. They establish short 
positions in stocks with high income-increasing discretionary accruals based on the 
quarterly financial accounting report and the 10-K report.  Prior research documents 
that earnings management causes stock mispricing in the capital market and thus the 
invested capital is not allocated efficiently.  Recent studies suggest that auditors and 
financial analysts do not see through earnings management. This study contributes to 
the existing literature on earnings management by investigating whether speculative 
short sellers can detect earnings management.  The results suggest that short sellers 
can detect earnings management by trading on the information in accruals and 
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